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ABSTRACT 
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Model, Democratization 
 
The thesis applies the external incentives model to the Turkish transformation, by 
analysing the effectiveness and credibility of political conditionality. The main empirical 
data used is drawn from the Regular Progress Reports that the European Commission 
prepared for the period of 1999 when Turkey was granted the status of candidate at the 
Helsinki Summit until 2016 when the most recent Progress Report was released. The 
thesis examines that to which extent and under which conditions political conditionality 
is highly effective in the case of Turkey and how the incumbent Turkish governments-
the coalition and the AKP governments- stayed on course to fulfil some of these 
conditions irrespective of the external and domestic obstacles put on the way to Turkey’s 
membership after 2005. The findings demonstrate despite the existence of main four 
variables of the model, it was the high domestic costs of compliance combined with the 
domestic veto players that notably determine the degree of reforms made by the 
government. This might also partly explain why the Turkish government gradually 
stopped complying with conditions after 2007 when the priorities of the AKP and the 
European Union began to diverge. The thesis further argues that domestic veto players, 
discussions on enlargement fatigue/ absorption capacity, alternative opportunities to EU 
membership- high privileged partnership-, lack of clear membership incentive and 
concern over the Cyprus dispute decreased the credibility of conditions in Turkey. These 
factors combined together to lessen the effectiveness of the EIM on Turkey.  
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ÖZET 
SİYASİ ŞARTLILIĞIN ELEŞTİREL İNCELEMESİ: 1999’DAN 2016’YA 
TÜRKİYE’DE SİYASAL DÖNÜŞÜM 
ÖZGE SARI 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Temmuz 2017 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği, Siyasi Şartlılık, Dış Teşvik Modeli 
Demokratikleştirme 
Bu tez; dış teşvik modelini Türkiye örneğinde uygulayarak siyasi şartlılığın etkinliğini ve 
güvenilirliğini analiz etmektedir.  Tezde kullanılan ampirik data, Türkiye’nin adaylığının 
ilan edildiği 1999 yılından son ilerleme raporunun yayınlandığı 2016 yılına kadar Avrupa 
Komisyonu tarafından hazırlanan ilerleme raporlarına dayanmaktadır.  Bu tez, siyasi 
şartlılığın ne ölçüde ve hangi bağlamda etkin olabileceğini Türkiye örneğinde 
incelemekte ve hükümetlerin- koalisyon hükümeti ve AK Parti hükümeti- 2005’den sonra 
Türkiye’nin AB üyeliğinin önüne konulan dış ve iç engellere rağmen, şartlılıkları nasıl 
yerine getirdiğini incelemektedir. Bulgular, modelin şartlılığın etkinliğini üzerine öne 
sürdüğü dört temel unsurdan farklı olarak, yüksek domestik bedelin-veto oyuncuları ile 
birlikte- hükümet tarafından gerçekleştirilen reformlar üzerinde daha fazla etkili 
olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu, aynı zamanda AK Parti ve Avrupa Birliği’nin 
önceliklerinin farklılaşmaya başladığı 2007 yılından itibaren, Türk hükümetinin 
şartlılıkları yerine getirmede neden yavaşladığını da kısmen açıklamaktadır. Bu tez dahası 
domestik veto aktörlerinin, genişleme yorgunluğunun/iltihak kapasitesinin, AB üyeliğine 
alternatiflerin- yüksek imtiyazlı ortaklık-, adaylık teşvikinin eksikliğinin ve Kıbrıs 
sorununun; şartlılığın Türkiye örneğinde güvenilirliğini düşürdüğünü tartışmaktadır. 
Bütün koşullar dikkate alındığında, dış teşvik modelinin etkinliği Türkiye örneğinde 
azalmaktadır.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The breakdown of the Berlin Wall as the end of the bipolar international system 
marked the beginning of a new era in 1990 within the presence fabric of the European 
Union (EU) as the EU notably started to concentrate on the wide range of tools to prepare 
itself for the unpredictable outcomes of the new world.  It has long been argued that the 
EU as a global actor constructed itself on the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights, and respect for minorities in particular for the Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEECs).1 In addition, many scholars argue that the strategy of political 
conditionality has been the most effective enlargement instrument of the EU to induce 
the target governments to meet EU conditions for the achievement of their 
democratization.2  
The rationale behind the strategy of conditionality is based on the ‘reinforcement 
by reward’ that the target governments would comply with EU rules in exchange of a 
certain set of rewards offered by the EU mainly ranging from association agreements to 
a full membership as in the case of Turkey.3 The question, here, under which conditions 
the target governments are willing to fulfil the conditions or is it EU incentives or other 
mechanisms that enforce them to comply with. To address this question, the thesis is 
based on the external incentives model, which emerged in the literature as a dominant 
model in its attempt to explain the enlargement and democratization strategy of the EU 
in the target/applicant states. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier argue that besides the 
                                                            
1 Frank Schimmelfennig, (2004), ‘The International promotion of Political Norms in Eastern Europe: A Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis’, Center for European Studies, Working paper No:61, p. 2 
 
2 Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel (2003), ‘Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact 
of EU Democratic Conditionality in Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey’, Journal of Common Market Studies 41, 3, p. 495-
518;  Heather Grabbe, (2002), “European Union Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire”, International 
Political Science Review, 23:3, p. 249- 268.;  Paul Kubicek (2011), ‘Political conditionality and European Union's 
cultivation of democracy in Turkey’, Democratization, Volume 18, Issue 4, p. 912;  Milada Anna Vachudova, (2005), 
‘Europe Undivided. Democracy, Leverage, and Integration Since 1989’, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
  
3 Schimmelfennig et al., (2003), Ibid., p. 496-97 
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External Incentives Model (EIM) to explain the rule adoption of the CEECs in line with 
the EU, there are two other alternative models: the social learning and lesson-drawing. 
They have also been used by scholars to analyse the political conditionality in the context 
of the EU. Social learning model particularly focuses on the ‘logic of appropriateness’ 
where apart from the rational choice model, actors involved in the process are encouraged 
from a set of norms, ideas and values rather than national interests and priorities.4 Lesson-
drawing model, on the other hand, argues that rule adoption achieved by the target 
governments is not based on the rewards, incentives or persuasion that the EU offers but 
is based on the necessity of ‘domestic dissatisfaction’ where the actors involved aim to 
resolve the internal problems by complying with EU rules.5  
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, by analysing rule adoption in cross-issue areas 
through a comparative study in the CEECs, conclude that even though these models are 
not ‘necessarily mutually exclusive’, they may be partly interconnected or separated and 
the EIM, however, has been the major explanatory power to investigate how political 
conditionality works and more importantly under which conditions it is effective and 
credible6 depending on the combination of four major factors, namely, (i) determinacy of 
conditions, (ii) size and speed of the reward, (iii) credibility of the incentives and (iv) size 
of the domestic cost combined with veto players.7  To analyse the effectiveness of 
conditionality in the case of Turkey, the thesis aims to test the hypotheses on the basis of 
the ‘judiciary section’ of each Progress Report published by the Commission for the 
period of 1999 when Turkey was granted the status of candidate until 2016, the most 
recent report released by the Commission. 
Kubicek emphasizes that Turkey presents a unique case for scholars interested in 
the EU’s democracy promotion, since Turkey is a good illustrator of both opportunities 
and obstacles for the democratic conditionality.8 Given the fact that Turkey was not 
                                                            
4 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, (2004a), ‘Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the 
candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 11, Issue 4, p. 667 
 
5 Ibid., p. 668 
 
6 Ibid., p. 663 
 
7 Ibid., p. 664 
 
8 Kubicek, Ibid., p. 911 
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included into the candidate states of the European Commission’s Agenda 2000 at the 
Luxemburg Summit, this constituted disappointment for Turkey as the country waiting 
longest at the EU door. This resulted in a serious crisis in Turkey-EU relations,9 which 
was resolved in a matter of two years when the EU gave Turkey the status of candidate.10 
The change in the nature of Turkey-EU relations just in two years and the immediate 
increase in the rule adoption that Turkey found itself after 1999 make it worth analysing 
the effectiveness of EU conditionality through the EIM. 
Based on the arguments derived from literature, this thesis further argues that the 
strategy of political conditionality for the democratization of Turkey had been highly 
effective for the period of 1999 to 2007. Turkey had undergone a process of rule adoption 
not only in technically low-cost issues but also politically high concern issues, including 
the demilitarization of Turkish politics, changing in the structure of National Security 
Council (NSC), or the abolishment of State Security Courts (SSCs). Therefore, EU’s 
political conditionality has impacted rule adoption in Turkey, specifically in the early 
years of the Justice and Development (AKP) government (2002-2007) but this impact 
gradually slowed down as it encountered a certain set of obstacles after the opening of 
accession negotiations in 2005, and increasingly after 2007.  In this respect, the thesis 
focuses on these major factors to understand why political reforms stalled post-2007 apart 
from the AKP’s first term in office. The key factor isolated in the thesis to explain the 
decline is the AKP government’s perceptions of the increased domestic costs of 
compliance in certain issue-areas.  
The main finding of the thesis, therefore, is that as shown by the model, four major 
variables have an important explanatory power on the analysis of the effectiveness of 
conditionality but it is the domestic costs of compliance combined with the domestic veto 
players that mostly shaped and determined the effectiveness of the level of conditionality 
in Turkey. One of the important concerns with regards to conditionality has been the issue 
of credibility.  
                                                            
9 Ali Aybey, (2004), “Turkey and the European Union Relations: A Historical Assessment”, Ankara Review of 
European Studies, 4:1, p. 19-38. 
 
10 Meltem Müftüler-Baç, (2005), “Turkey’s Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union”, South European 
Society and Politics, 10: 01, p. 16-30. 
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Schimmelfennig et al. state that: “EU conditionality finally became credible when 
the EU granted Turkey ‘candidacy status’ at Helsinki in December 1999.” 11 There is no 
doubt that a clear EU membership prospective would encourage the target states to 
comply with EU rules as much as possible in order to ultimately become an EU member.12 
Since the conditions of the EU are not open to negotiations, the applicant countries must 
meet the requirements to receive the reward.13 However, the EU promised that accession 
negotiations will be opened with Turkey by the end of 2005. Therefore, the clear 
membership incentive came after 2004 that most of the reforms were realized by the AKP 
government in the absence of a clear membership. Two years matter because it has been 
the times when there is high effectiveness of EU conditionality. By arguing that the 
reforms were not the outcome of a clear membership, does not falsify that the declaration 
of Turkey’s candidacy or good neighbourly relations between the EU and Turkey does 
not have an impact on the rule adoption. In addition to this, I further argue that as the 
priorities of the AKP government perfectly match with the demands of the EU such as 
non-intervention of military into Turkish politics; the government, therefore, strategically 
used and justified EU conditions to base its political power and not to have a same fate 
with its successors-Welfare Party and Virtue Party, which were all banned from politics 
by the Turkish military as the guardian of the secular-Kemalist character of the Turkish 
state. Based on the analysis, conditionality is most effective when the government has 
low degree of domestic cost of compliance.  
Turkey as the candidate waiting longest for EU membership-as it has an 
Association Agreement dating to 1963, and an application for full membership in 1987- 
has never been ensured that the door of the EU will be finally open even if and when the 
country fulfils the conditions. While the domestic veto players within the EU had the 
capability to put many obstacles on the road of Turkish entry, Turkey’s own internal 
                                                            
11 Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel, (2006), ‘International Socialization in Europe, Palgrave 
Macmillan UK, p. 105 Quoted in Beken Saatcioglu, (2007), Compliance or Non-Compliance? The Causal Pathways 
of the European Union’s Political Accession Conditionality in Poland, Romania and Turkey, paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, 
USA, Access 25 April 2017, Available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p180217_index.html 
 
12 Bernard Steunenberg and Antoaneta Dimitrova (2007), Compliance in the EU Enlargement Process: The Limits of 
Conditionality, European Integration Online Papers (EIoP), Vol.11 No.5, p.3, Access 5 April 2017 Available at 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2007-005.pdf; Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, (2005), ‘Conclusions: The 
Impact of the EU on the Accession Countries’ in: Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds.) The 
Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, p. 215 
 
13 Ibid., p. 53 
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problems also played important roles. As argued by many scholars, Turkey’s compliance 
with EU rules started to face with a clear disruption after the opening of accession 
negotiations.14 The studies have admitted EU conditionality as the most successful 
foreign policy but the findings of the thesis argue that apart from the literature, 
conditionality framework in the case of Turkey does not work as it was expected to be. 
This only works when domestic environment is favourable.15  While this is already shown 
explicitly by various studies16 a comprehensive analysis of the Progress reports and how 
Turkey exactly complied with the EU demands is missing. This thesis adds to this body 
of knowledge with its systematic analysis of the Progress Reports on multiple issue areas.  
The thesis is organized in the following manner: Chapter two is designed to specify 
the hypotheses and methodological framework. Chapter three discusses the current 
literature on political conditionality in relation with the external incentives model. 
Chapter four testes the hypotheses based on the empirical data drawn from the judiciary 
section of the Progress Reports between the years of 1999 and 2016, and examines the 
impact of the domestic veto players within the EU and Turkey on the effectiveness and 
credibility of EU conditionality in particular post-2007 period. In the last chapter, I will 
conclude the thesis.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
14 Beken Saatcioglu, (2007), ‘Compliance or Non-Compliance? The Causal Pathways of the European Union’s Political 
Accession Conditionality in Poland, Romania and Turkey’, paper presented at the annual meeting of the International 
Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, Access 25 April 2017, Available 
at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p180217_index.html  
 
15 Frank Schimmelfennig and Hanno Scholtz, (2007), ‘EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood: 
Conditionality, Economic Development, and Linkage’, Paper for EUSA Biennial Conference, Montreal, May 2007, 
p.3 
 
16 Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, Ibid.; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, (2004a), Ibid., p. 661-679 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODOLOGY 
Aftermath of the Cold War Era, the number of studies analysing the effectiveness 
and credibility of political conditionality has been numerous since the strategy of political 
conditionality has been salient on EU agenda.17 The membership of European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) countries in 1995, the signing of European treaties with the CEECs 
and the announcement of their candidacy first in 1997 Luxemburg summit, and then in 
1999 Helsinki Summit; the issue has been particularly analysed on the basis of the CEECs 
in the early years of the 2000s. The studies predominantly focus on the democratization 
of those countries through a comparative study.18This is also why, the thesis takes upon 
political conditionality as the most effective instrument for the EU, and uses the external 
incentives model to assess its salience. 
Case selection 
The case study of Turkey is based on the theoretical assessment of the hypotheses 
provided by the external incentives model on political conditionality. The selection of 
Turkey as a case study is derived from the fact that the country presents a unique case for 
the analysis of political conditionality.  
Turkey’s long complicated EU adventure started with its first application to the EU 
16 days after the Greek application in 1959.19 The Commission at the time granted the 
status of ‘association’ to both parties in order to keep them in the sphere of Western part 
against the Communist threat.  
                                                            
17 Grabbe (2002); Schimmelfennig et al. (2003); Vachudova (2005); Kubicek (2011) 
 
18 Schimmelfennig 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004a; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2007; Burç Yıldız 2014 
 
19 Meltem Müftüler-Baç, (1997), ‘Europe in Change: Turkey’s Relations with a Changing Europe’, Manchester 
University Press 
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What makes interesting and worth studying Turkey with regards to political 
conditionality is that the country was not announced among the candidate states in the 
Luxemburg Summit of the EU in 1997 by stating that: 
‘The Council confirms Turkey's eligibility for accession to the European Union. Turkey will be judged on 
the basis of the same criteria as the other applicant States. While the political and economic conditions 
allowing accession negotiations to be envisaged are not satisfied, the European Council considers that it is 
nevertheless important for a strategy to be drawn up to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer 
to the European Union in every field.’20  
However, only two years later, Turkey was granted the status of candidate in the 
Helsinki Summit in 1999. The Council stated that: 
‘The European Council welcomes recent positive developments in Turkey as noted in the Commission's 
progress report, as well as its intention to continue its reforms towards complying with the Copenhagen 
criteria. Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied 
to the other candidate States.’21  
The year, 1999, therefore can be considered as one of the turning points in Turkey-
EU relations due to the fact that the EU explicitly acknowledged that Turkey is a 
European country, which desires to join the EU. Turkey’s Europeanness, therefore, was 
confirmed by the EU.  
Given the fact that Turkey rapidly started to adopt a wide range of reform packages, 
this does not change the notion that there has always been continuous tension between 
the EU and Turkey. These tensions mostly concentrate on the Turkish fulfilment of EU 
conditions on the so-called sensitive issues such as the removal of death penalty, retrial 
of Abdullah Öcalan- the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)- or the 
abolishment of the SSCs which were heavily criticized by the EU. However, my aim is 
to show that Turkey took the issue seriously and tried to comply with EU rules in the 
initial times of the AKP government by adopting a wide range of harmonization packages, 
amending the Turkish Constitution in line with EU rules and making further reforms for 
the democratization of the country with regards to the Penal and Civil Code. However, 
the efforts of Turkey to comply with EU rules turned into a direct opposition after 2007 
                                                            
20 Luxemburg Summit, Presidency Conclusions, 12 and 13 December 1997, Access 3 March 2017, Available at  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lux1_en.htm#enlarge 
 
21 Helsinki Summit, Presidency Conclusions, 10 and 11 December 1999, Access 15 March 2017 Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm 
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when the tension between the EU and Turkey on the fulfilment of conditions become 
obvious. As argued by Schimmelfennig et al., it would be better to select controversial 
cases in order to indicate both effectiveness and backslidings of the conditionality.22 As 
the golden age of conditionality in Turkey between the years of 2002-2007 was reversed 
particularly after 2012, it is important to analyse the major factors, which brought 
ineffectiveness of political conditionality. Therefore, the research question of the thesis 
is as follows: to what extent and under which conditions political conditionality has been 
effective during the period of 1999 and 2007, and which factors can be used to explain 
the main engines behind the changing strategy of the AKP government after 2012 based 
on the analysis of the external incentives model? 
External Incentives Model 
The external incentives model was introduced by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
to analyse the main motive behind the political conditionality.23 The EIM highly used in 
the literature of political conditionality is founded on the method of rational choice where 
actors involved in the process are assumed to act for the maximization of their own 
benefits at the bargaining table.24 Actors take their decisions based on the cost-benefit 
assessment that if the expected utility of the reward is higher than the expected cost of 
compliance, then the target government fulfils the conditions.25 In other words, the reward 
offered by the EU must be worth complying with conditions for the target country.26 Even 
though, the target government has to fulfil the conditions and the EU must pay the reward 
as exchange of the compliance, political conditionality in the context of the EU, is based 
on mutual but asymmetrical bargaining process due to the fact that the EU stands as the 
only decision-maker, which has the ultimate say.27 Given the fact that the EU has right to 
                                                            
22 Schimmelfennig et al., (2003), Ibid., p. 503 
  
23 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, (2004a), Ibid., p. 662-63 
 
24 Schimmelfennig, (2004), Ibid., p. 3 
 
25 Schimmelfennig et al., (2003), Ibid., p. 496-97 
 
26 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, (2004a), Ibid., p. 662 
 
27 Schimmelfennig, (2004), Ibid., p. 4 
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decide on the payment or withdrawal of the reward, does not mean that the target state 
has no bargaining power. 
The model predominantly argues that the target states would comply with 
conditions set by the international organization in exchange of a certain reward. The 
rewards in the context of the EU has been ranging from trade and association agreements 
to full EU membership. However, as emphasized by Schimmelfennig, membership 
incentive in comparison with other rewards, has been the dominant engine to induce the 
target states to fulfil the conditions.28 As pointed out by Börzel and Risse, the strategy of 
political conditionality as a foreign policy instrument directly or indirectly brings about 
certain changes on the structure of the target countries through interstate bargaining or 
role of domestic actors.29 However, the model further argues that there are additional 
factors that have to be taken into account for the effectiveness of political conditionality: 
the determinacy of conditions, the size and pace of rewards, the credibility of threats and 
promises, and the size of domestic costs of compliance.30 
Determinacy of conditions 
The concept of determinacy of conditions refers to a situation where the EU clearly 
sets the compulsory conditions and rules, which require the target governments to fulfil 
in exchange of the reward. The model in the context of the EU argues that as long as the 
EU clearly sets the conditions without any question, this strategy would enable the target 
governments to easily fulfil the conditions.31 EIM argues that effectiveness of 
conditionality increases when the conditions are clear that the target government will be 
ensured what to comply with.32  In the early years of political conditionality, particularly 
when the EU announced its famous Copenhagen criteria, it had been highly criticized on 
                                                            
28 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, (2005a), ‘Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern 
Europe’ in: Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds.), The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, p. 10-17 
 
29Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, (2000), ‘When Europe hits home: Europeanization and domestic change’, European 
Integration Online Papers, 4(15), p. 6-7  
 
30 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, (2004a), Ibid. p. 664 
 
31 Ibid. 
 
32 Ibid.  
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the point that since democracy has been debatable issue over time and there is no 
universal, well-accepted definition on it, what does the EU mean by arguing that the 
applicant country must have functioning democracy.33 On the one hand, determinacy of 
conditions not only would draw a clear roadmap for the target governments that they 
would know what to do for the achievement of the reward, but also would strengthen the 
credibility of conditions by treating the candidate governments on equal footings.34 As 
emphasized by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, the clear set of conditions also prevents 
the manipulation of EU requirements by the target governments. On the other hand, if 
conditions were not clearly set, this would raise the question of how the EU fairly decides 
whether the conditions are fulfilled by the target government.35 The unclarity of 
conditions would weaken the legitimacy and credibility of conditions in the eyes of the 
target states.36 Therefore, the hypothesis with regards to determinacy of conditions as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The effectiveness of political conditionality increases when the rules are 
clearly set and more determinate to the target states.  
Size and speed of rewards 
One of the important concerns over the effectiveness of conditionality is the size 
and speed of rewards. As argued by Smith, rewards offered by the EU have an impact on 
the degree of compliance.37 Despite the fact that the EU has a wide range of rewards to 
encourage the target governments such as financial aid, trade or association agreements, 
it has been the membership prospective that enforces them to fulfil the conditions at most 
so that the size and credibility of the reward have to be sufficient.38 Size of the reward 
                                                            
33 Uğur Burç Yıldız, (2012), ‘The European Union and Democratic Consolidation in Turkey: The Impacts and Limits’, 
in Müge Aknur (Ed.), Democratic Consolidation in Turkey, Universal Publishers, Florida, p. 285 
 
34 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, (2004a), Ibid., p. 664 
 
35 Ibid. 
 
36 Ibid. 
 
37 Karen Smith, (2001), ‘Western actors and the promotion of democracy’, in J. Zielonka and A. Pravda (eds), 
Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Volume 2: International and Transnational Factors, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 37-8 
 
38 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, (2004a), Ibid., p. 665 
 
11 
 
plays a critical role in the effectiveness of conditionality as they would not try to fulfil the 
conditions in the absence of feasible accession negotiations. In this respect, once the target 
government fulfils the conditions, the EU should immediately pay the reward that 
duration of payment should not be longer, which would decrease the credibility of 
conditionality.39 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier argue that credibility of EU rewards 
will be higher once the accession negotiations will be started with the target state, which 
indicates the goodwill and serious of the EU to pursue the process further. Even though 
the EU attached a particular importance to the integration of the CEECs in the early years 
of the 1990s, one of the turning points of the process has been the signing of association 
agreement with those countries, which indicates the consistency of the payment of EU 
rewards.40 The EU apparently demonstrated its willing to admit the CEECs by taking 
immediate measures and setting certain mechanism, which would accelerate the process 
at the end. Therefore, the hypotheses with regards to size and pace of conditionality as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 2: The higher size of rewards, the more effectiveness of political 
conditionality.  
Hypothesis 3: Opening of accession negotiations with the target state would accelerate 
the fulfilment of conditions.  
Credibility of Conditionality 
Credibility of conditionality constructs one of the important pillars of conditionality 
referring to a situation where the EU either pays the reward in the case of compliance or 
withholds the reward in the case of non-compliance.41 The announcement of the 
candidacy of the CEECs can be a good illustrator of the demonstration of the credibility 
of conditions when the first group so-called ‘Luxemburg Group’ was granted the status 
of candidacy, which further encouraged the Helsinki Group to comply with EU rules that 
as long as the target governments fulfil the conditions, the EU would deliver the reward.42 
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Therefore, the target governments would be ensured that once they fulfil the conditions 
required to attain the reward, there would be no further justification not to deliver the 
reward by the EU, which has not been the case in Turkey.  
Domestic Cost of Compliance 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier argue that in the case of clear conditions and 
membership incentive offered to target governments, the size of domestic costs of 
compliance predominantly determines the decision of the target governments to comply 
with conditions or not.43 They stress the point that domestic compliance with EU rules 
always puts certain costs on the target governments because otherwise the target 
governments would not make further reforms without any rewards.44 According to 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, there may be a set of costs ranging from opportunity 
costs to adoption costs that when the rewards are not worth for complying with EU 
conditions, target governments may prefer adopting alternative rules rather than EU rules 
or compliance with EU conditions may empower the costs of private and public actors.45  
As stressed by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, as the target government is the 
major authority to comply with EU rules by calculating the expected costs and benefits, 
the degree of effectiveness of political conditionality therefore depends on the 
governmental interests and preferences and at the same time other domestic veto players, 
who hold the power to give the ‘necessary permission for a change in the status quo’.46 
One can assume that the number of veto players and their bargaining power play a key 
role in the outcome of the fulfilment. As put by the Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, ‘the 
scarcity of veto players increases the inﬂuence of the government as the main target of 
EU conditionality and the causal relevance of its cost-beneﬁt assessment.’47 Therefore, 
the hypothesis regarding the adoption costs is as follows: 
                                                            
43 Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, (2007), Ibid., p.6-7 
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 Hypothesis 4: The higher level of domestic costs of compliance and veto players in the 
target state, the lower degree of effectiveness of political conditionality. 
As the thesis aims to investigate the effectiveness of political conditionality in the 
case of Turkey by using the external incentives model, it will be utilizing the data from 
the Regular Progress Reports per each year published by the European Commission 
assessing Turkey’s ability to meet the EU’s accession criteria. These are done on three 
different levels in line with the 1993 Copenhagen criteria- the political, economic 
conditions as well as the ability to adopt the EU’s acquis communautaire.   
The dependent variable of the thesis in the context of EU conditionality is the rule 
adoption achieved by the target state, Turkey, and assessed by the Progress Reports 
annually.  A series of reform packages adopted by the Turkish government will be used 
as an illustrator of how Turkey domestically harmonizes its legal system in line with 
Continental Europe. In turn, the issues, which have been highly criticized by the EU and 
the government demonstrates resistance to make further reforms will indicate the issue-
areas, in which the government has high level of domestic compliance. Certain 
differences between compliance and non-compliance of EU demands will construct the 
basis of the thesis to test the hypotheses. In this respect, the independent variables of the 
external incentives model will be ‘effectiveness and credibility’ of EU conditionality in 
the case of Turkey.  As long as Turkey fulfils the conditions required by the EU by 
adopting further reforms and legal changes into domestic law, conditionality will be 
considered as effective. Payment of the reward to the target state in exchange of 
compliance then will be considered as ‘credible’.   
Regular Progress Reports of the European Commission 
The EU frequently emphasized the point that other additional mechanisms were 
needed to provide successful integration of the CEECs into the EU. The introduction of 
famous Copenhagen criteria at the Copenhagen Summit of the EU in 1993 plays an 
important role to increase this control mechanism.48 Even though the Commission has 
always been responsible for giving the recommendation with regards to membership of 
the candidate country, the Commission with the introduction of the Copenhagen criteria, 
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now has the authorisation to assess whether the candidate state complies with the 
conditions or in which areas further progress and reforms are needed. To achieve this, the 
Commission annually prepares progress reports, which evaluates the general process of 
the candidate countries for the membership.49  
The Commission through Progress Reports gives ‘recommendations’ to the Council 
and Parliament about the progress of the country. Even though the Commission’s 
recommendation is not legally binding, it is important to indicate the eligibility status of 
the target country. It is worth mentioning that the Commission’s famous report on the 
eligibility of Turkey’s membership given in 1989 states that ‘The political and economic 
situation in Turkey leads the Commission to believe that it would not be useful to open 
accession negotiations with Turkey straight away.’50 As shown in the report, Turkey was 
described as a country where she suffered from poor economic conditions, lack of 
democracy, political pluralism and the rule of law. Commission particularly emphasized 
the point that as long as Cyprus dispute remains unresolved and there will be a dispute 
between Turkey and one-member state, namely, Greece; then Turkey cannot become a 
member of the EU.51 Therefore, the Commission’s recommendation about the country, 
irrespective of its unbinding status, gives certain insights to the Council and Parliament, 
which are the major decision mechanisms within the EU for opening of accession 
negotiation, opening and closing of chapters and finally granting the status of 
membership.  
Progress reports for the analysis of progress of the candidate states prepared by the 
Commission will construct the base of the thesis. The Commission’s Progress Reports as 
the main data in this study for the effectiveness of conditionality, have been on EU agenda 
when Turkey’s candidacy was given at the Helsinki Summit. The first Progress Report, 
thus, was published in that year on the basis of Luxemburg Summit and Ankara 
Agreement. The reports have been composed of different chapters ranging from political 
criteria to economic conditions. I will in particular analyse the judiciary part, which 
assesses the domestic rule adoption that Turkey has undertaken. As shown in the Progress 
                                                            
49 European Neighbour Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Access 25 May 2017, Available at 
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Reports, the Commission sometimes refers to the European Court of Human Rights as 
Turkey is member of the Council of Europe, which demonstrates us the importance of 
their critiques about the democracy level of Turkey.  
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Aftermath of the Cold War Era when the Central and Eastern European Countries 
gained their independence from the Soviet Union, the EU as a sui-generis organization 
based on the peaceful development of the continent through mutual co-operation 
introduced a new strategy so-called ‘conditionality’ and immediately increased its tools 
to cope with possible threats that the EU may face stemming from the new world order. 
The EU founded on the basis of promoting core principles, including liberal democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights and respect for minority groups in particular in the case of 
eastern enlargement, concentrated on the integration of the other part of the continent 
where they were not familiar with these concepts under the Communist regime.52 Instead 
of directly making them an EU member, the EU introduced a new complex framework 
‘conditionality’ in order to gradually integrate them into the membership and to hinder 
the possible drawbacks that the EU would face.53 Political conditionality, therefore, 
emerged as a new enlargement strategy of the EU to democratize and integrate those 
countries in line with EU rules, norms and principles.54  
In a simple logic, conditionality means that if the player A wants the player B to do 
something, player A puts certain conditions or rules in exchange of the reward that the 
player B would like to obtain. In the context of the EU, the EU as the player A aimed to 
integrate the CEECs into the EU due to a number of political and economic reasons. Since 
they were not fully ready to become an EU member, the EU holding a superior position 
in this mutual but asymmetrical relationship sets a series of conditions for the player B to 
be complied with. Therefore, conditionality based on the idea of asymmetrical 
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interdependence to receive a certain set of rewards depends on the fulfilment of 
conditions, unilaterally set by the EU. 
The fourth enlargement of the EU on May 1, 2004, had been realized with the 
membership of ten countries, namely, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic.55 In order to eliminate 
possible drawbacks that the eastward enlargement may put on the presence architect of 
the EU, the Union introduced the conditionality principle for the sake of political and 
economic stability within and around the EU. In the Copenhagen Summit of the EU in 
1993, all applicant countries were required to fulfil the conditions for the purpose of 
becoming an EU member based on the ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities’.56 EU 
enlargement achieved in 1995, including Austria, Finland and Sweden were not obliged 
to fulfil the conditions related to human rights but they were required accepting the 
common foreign and security policy.57 After the Copenhagen criteria, conditionality 
therefore, applied on the CEECs for the first time with a special attention on Turkey. Even 
though major conditions for the membership of Turkey were already set in the Treaty of 
Ankara in 1963, Turkey was also obliged to fulfil the conditions, which had been designed 
for the CEECs.58 The EU through conditionality aimed to ensure that the CEECs are fully 
ready to become an EU member. The EU clearly expressed its willing to support political 
transition and rule adoption of the CEECs into the EU by granting them first financial and 
then ultimately membership in the case of full compliance with EU conditions. The new 
duty of the EU after the breakdown of the Soviet Union through conditionality, therefore, 
was to provide technical expertise, offer financial assistance, and control the political 
transformation of domestic institutions.59  
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The EU first informally and then formally developed new strategies for the 
integration of the CEECs based on the fulfilment of democratic and human rights 
conditions as a pre-condition, which would induce the target governments to comply with 
EU rules.60 As Saatcioglu argues that use of EU conditionality after the early years of 
1990s has been evolved and increased over time into a more dynamic structure with a 
particular aim that the target governments are fully ready for EU membership.61  
Political conditionality as a foreign policy instrument used by the EU, sets certain 
rules and procedures that the target governments must fulfil as exchange of the reward 
such as financial assistance, association or full EU membership.62 The enlargement policy 
has been considered as the most effective foreign policy of the EU,63 which started its 
way with 6 members and extended to 28 with the participation of Denmark, Ireland and 
the UK in 1973, Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, and Austria, Finland and 
Sweden in 1995.64 They argue that taking consideration of the EU strategies for the 
democratization of the CEECs, it has been the democratic conditionality that became the 
most effective. The main driving engine behind the fulfilment of conditions in the strategy 
of the EU has been the idea of ‘reinforcement by reward’ rather than punishment. 
Schimmelfennig et al. argue that the strategy of EU political conditionality policy is 
developed in such a way that the EU is the major authority either paying the reward in 
the case of compliance or withdrawing the reward in the case of non-compliance rather 
than imposing extra costs or using coercive instruments to force the target government to 
comply with the conditions.65 
The main motivation behind the reinforcement strategy lies on the argument that 
applicant countries would be in favour of complying with EU conditions in order to be 
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rewarded rather than be punished in the case of non-compliance. In the context of the EU, 
there are two major ways of reinforcement offered to non-members, namely, financial 
assistance and institutional ties including trade and cooperation agreements, association 
agreements, and full membership.66 Grabbe points out that despite the fact that the EU 
offers a wide range of rewards to the target governments in return of the fulfilment of 
conditions, it has been the membership prospective that forces the government to comply 
with conditions at most due to its tangible material outcomes.67 Material incentives are 
assumed to be more effective to make the target governments to change their domestic 
policies.68 They would comply with all the conditions once the reward is higher than the 
domestic cost of compliance on the basis of bargaining framework. Thus, EU membership 
as the ultimate highest reward that the EU offers to the target governments can be 
regarded as the most effective incentive for the purpose of rule adoption of the target 
state.69 
Lavenex and Schimmelfennig emphasize the point that effectiveness of the 
conditionality highly depends on the cost-benefit assessment of the target governments 
that the expected utility of the reward has to be greater than the expected cost of domestic 
compliance.70 If the benefits of the reward are relatively higher than the costs of domestic 
compliance, the government would be more enthusiastic to fulfil the conditions.71       
As argued by Kubicek, if the expected benefits of the reward will not exceed the 
domestic cost of compliance or further endanger the national priorities of the states such 
as territorial integrity or identity, then the target government may be reluctant to comply 
with EU conditionality. The effectiveness of the conditionality may be weakened as the 
target government has other political or economic alternatives or public is not very sure 
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about the payment of the reward in the case of compliance resulting in an opposite way 
that the EU expected.72  
To enhance the effectiveness and credibility of the conditionality in the target states, 
the rewards offered by the EU plays a significant role through either material incentives 
such as financial assistance/trade agreement or institutional ties- membership. In this 
respect, it is unsurprisingly supposed that the more rewards the EU offers, the more 
domestic compliance of the target states. Schimmelfennig underlines the point that 
possible domestic costs within the target state play a critical role for the success of 
conditionality since the government is the higher authority to make cost-benefit 
calculation and therefore to decide on the fulfilment of the conditions. The lower cost of 
domestic political compliance means more expected effectiveness of the conditionality.73  
To reach a credible conditionality, Schimmelfennig argues that there are two ways. 
First of all, the target government must know that as long as they will comply with all 
conditions, the reward will be paid by the EU. In the absence of the reward, the target 
state may be reluctant to fulfil the conditions. Secondly, rules and procedures have to be 
set in a clear way without any question between the target state and the EU. Both parties 
have to be ensured that they know what they expect from each other.74 Some scholars 
underline the point that the political aspect of the Copenhagen criteria encompasses a 
particular problem of unclarity that to which extent the EU means a functioning 
democracy since there is no universal consensus on the definition of ‘democracy’.75 The 
effectiveness of the conditionality is highly related to clarity of conditions that how they 
are clearly set and equally applied to the target states without any further question on the 
legitimacy of them, which also prevents possible manipulation of the conditions by the 
target governments.76 Saatçioglu argues that if the conditionality imposed by the EU on 
a candidate country is not related to what is expected from the Copenhagen criteria with 
                                                            
72 Kubicek, (2011), Ibid., p. 913 
 
73 Schimmelfennig et al., (2003), Ibid. p. 495-518 
 
74 Schimmelfennig, (2004a), Ibid., p.920 
 
75 Burç Yıldız, (2012), Ibid., p. 285 
 
76 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, (2004a), Ibid., p. 664 
 
21 
 
regard to enforcement of democratic, economic and administrative structure of the 
country, then this would raise the question of credibility of the conditionality.77  
The EU has been the dominant authority holding a superior bargaining power in the 
process of the fulfilment of conditions over the target states since the EU is the primary 
mechanism to set conditions, elaborate the development of each country based on 
‘differentiation’ and decide on paying/withdrawing the reward offered to the target state. 
The structure of political conditionality set on the basis of non-negotiable rules, which 
strictly forces the target states to harmonize its policies in line with the EU does not mean 
that non-member states are totally dependent on the EU and must do what the EU 
demanded from.78 Even though EU rules are set by the member states alone, non-member 
states still have the capacity to manipulate or change it in the direction of its 
advantageous. The most important thing, here, is the bargaining power of the non-
member states and how they prefer using their ‘ultimate’ trump card. In this respect, to 
eliminate possible problem regarding the assessment of the progress of applicant 
countries, the EU particularly underlines the point that each candidate will be equally 
treated on the basis of their individual efforts so-called ‘differentiation’. As stated by the 
European Commission: 
 ‘Aspirant countries can only proceed from one stage of the accession process to the next once they have 
met the conditions for that stage. Moreover, the Commission is prepared to recommend the suspension of 
progress in case of a serious and persistent breach of the EU’s fundamental principles, or if a country fails 
to meet essential requirements at any stage.’79  
It is important to remember that even though the Commission’s basic role in this 
process is based on ‘facilitator’ between the target government and the EU, the 
recommendation given by the Commission on the development status of the target state 
plays an important role for the declaration of its candidacy in the eyes of the Council 
where all member states unanimously must agree on it.80 
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Thus, aftermath of the Cold War Era, the introduction of EU conditionality policy 
through the strategy of reinforcement by reward has gradually become the key strategy 
of EU enlargement in order to force applicant states to fulfil the conditions in exchange 
of rewards. Apart from the other carrots that the EU offers, the reward of membership in 
the case of the eastern enlargement proved to be the most influential mechanism, which 
notably determines the degree of compliance with the conditions. On the one hand, 
eastern enlargement particularly demonstrates that low domestic political costs for the 
ruling elites combined with clear EU incentive strongly bring about the efficiency of 
conditions. Cost-benefit assessment of the target government plays a key role for 
domestic compliance. On the other hand, even though Turkey and other candidate 
countries have been obliged to meet the requirements, the process has been more 
complicated and Turkey in particular represents a mixed picture for the analysis of 
political conditionality.  
Therefore, in the next chapter, I will test the effectiveness and credibility of EU 
conditionality policy in the case of Turkey through Progress Reports from 1999 to 2016 
based on the hypotheses provided by the external incentives model.  
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CHAPTER 4 
EFFECTIVENESS OF EU CONDITIONALITY 
The Period of Golden Era in EU Conditionality: 1999-2006 
The External Incentives Model introduced by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier to 
investigate the effectiveness and credibility of political conditionality has been an 
important reference point as in the case of Turkey. Schimmelfennig states that ‘EU 
conditionality finally became credible when the EU granted Turkey ‘candidacy status’ at 
Helsinki Summit in December 1999’.81 The year, 1999, marked the beginning of a new 
era in Turkey-EU Relations. Turkey as the official candidate, which desires to join the 
EU has undergone a new process of reform adoption in order to meet the EU requirements 
in exchange of the reward, which is the opening of accession negotiations. As the 
effectiveness of conditionality depends on the combination of four variables, (i) 
determinacy of conditions, (ii) size and speed of the reward, (iii) credibility of the 
incentives and (iv) size of the domestic cost,82 I will particularly discuss the effectiveness 
of conditionality in the case of Turkey by analysing the Progress Reforms on the basis of 
rule adoption. 
The EU’s anchor for the democratization of Turkey has been most effective 
between the years of 1999 and 2007. The timeframe of 1999- 2007 should also be divided 
into two sub-periods. The first period begins with 1999 when the Commission granted 
Turkey a candidate state at the Helsinki Summit and when the tripartite coalition 
government was formed by DSP, ANAP and MHP, ended with the 2002 general elections 
that the incumbent AKP government came into power as being the first single-party 
government since 1987.  
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Since 1999, Turkey has undergone a process of rule adoption regarding its judicial 
system in line with the EU. The reforms taken during the period of 1999 and 2007 were 
mostly based on the issues, largely criticized by the EU, such as the abolishment of the 
SSCs, the composition of the NSC, and fundamental rights and freedoms. Despite the size 
of the material costs of the rule adoption, Turkey demonstrated a high degree of 
commitment for the fulfilment of the conditions during the time period of 1999 and 2007 
when the EU first declared Turkey as an official candidate state and then clearly stated 
that accession negotiations with Turkey will be open once Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen 
political criteria, which increased the credibility of conditionality and therefore induced 
the incumbent government to pursue political reforms in various areas. As put by 
Noutcheva and Aydın-Düzgit, over the half of the judicial reforms made in the 1982 
Turkish Constitution had been achieved between the years of 1999 and 2005.83 
The declaration of Turkey’s candidacy in 1999 marked the beginning of a ‘reform 
process’. The coalition government formed by the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the 
Motherland Party (ANAP), and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) from 1999 until 2002, 
demonstrated an important level of fulfilment of the conditions in line with the EU.  
Progress Reports between the years of 1999 and 2002 state that Turkey as an official 
candidate of the EU started to comply with EU conditions. However, as argued by Öniş, 
given that there had been progress for the fulfilment of conditions, the government still 
remained reluctant not to comply with high concern political issues such as minority 
rights, judicial reforms or fight against corruption.84  
As proposed by External Incentives Model, the number of domestic veto players 
notably determines the effectiveness of political conditionality. If the number of veto 
players is low, the government most likely shows high degree of compliance with 
conditions. Given the fact that Turkey had always witnessed the failure of coalition 
governments, which are generally composed of ideologically extreme parties, one can 
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therefore argue that the possible resonance and tensions among the coalition parties 
towards the fulfilment of conditions led to a decrease in the level of compliance.  
As the political parties have been the main actors behind the rule adoption, the 
stance of the political parties in the parliament towards Turkey’s EU membership plays a 
key role whether they would support for or oppose to the compliance with the 
requirements. Even though the EU’s demands have always remained constant requiring 
mainly the functioning liberal democracy and the rule of law, the pace of the rule adoption 
in line with the EU has varied across the material costs of the ruling elites, the presence 
of the veto players and the EU’s credibility, weakening the commitment and compliance 
of the conditions.  
Table 1: Presence of the four variables of the EIM in the case of Turkey from 1999 to 2016 
  1999-2001                                        2002-2006 2007-2011 2012-2016 
Cost High High High High 
Commitment Relatively high High Relatively high Low 
Compliance Relatively high High Relatively high Low 
Credibility High High Low Low 
Domestic veto 
players 
High 
• MHP 
• DSP in the 
initial years 
Low 
*No visible 
veto player 
High 
• Turkish 
military  
• Constitutional 
Court  
• Opposition 
parties  
• Societal 
resistance 
(Republic 
Meetings) 
High 
• Opposition 
parties  
• Societal 
resistance 
(Gezi 
event) 
• Corruption 
scandal 
combined 
with 
Gulen 
movement 
 
DSP as the main coalition partner gradually supported the compliance with the EU 
conditions for the purpose of the accession and took the necessary steps, culminating the 
political reforms in line with the EU.85 The second coalition partner, MHP known as the 
far-right nationalist party was reluctant to comply with the EU conditions. Despite the 
fact that all parties agreed on the prospective EU membership, MHP demonstrated a 
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strong resistance not to comply with the EU requirement concerning the minority rights 
as the Kurdish issue puts a significant problem for the territorial indivisibility and national 
unity of the Turkish state. ANAP, the third coalition party, was the major party that 
supported the EU membership, and therefore, to comply with the conditions.86 The main 
engine behind the political reforms taken by the coalition government was the efforts of 
the ANAP to encourage the DSP and the ultimate EU membership.87 Despite the 
amendments, the ideological differences and divergent preferences of the coalition parties 
regarding the role of the military, slowed down the rule adoption. During the process of 
tripartite coalition government, only two reform packages had been adopted in October 
2001 and August 2002 just before the breakdown of the coalition government.88 The 
reform packages taken by the coalition government was actually outcome of the ad hock 
coalition of the DSP and ANAP.89 Therefore, divergent priorities of the coalition partners 
and the lack of a common view regarding the fulfilment of the EU conditions increased 
the size of internal adoption costs, which decreased the compliance of the ruling elites 
and effectiveness of the EU conditionality. The high number of domestic veto players 
between the years of 1999 and 2002 decreased the degree of compliance with EU 
conditions as MHP remained resistant to make further reforms. 
During this time, another important issue, which negatively affected the progress 
of rule adoption had been the capture of Abdullah Öcalan-leader of the PKK. MHP had 
always attached a particular issue area to indivisibility of Turkish nation and territorial 
integrity as its primary party policies. Schimmelfennig et al. argue that the capture of 
Öcalan decreased the level of domestic compliance with regards to Kurdish issue and 
freedom of expression as Öcalan stated that the problem should be solved in a political 
manner.90  As stated in the Progress Reports and shown by the model, despite the fact that 
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there had been progress to meet EU conditions by the coalition government, it remained 
limited particularly in high concern political issues.  
The progress Reports stressed the point that the reforms made by the coalition 
government regarding the demilitarisation of the politics at the end of the 1990s were not 
sufficient. Further efforts had to be taken not only in the SSCs but also other state 
institutions, including the Council of Higher Education, the Higher Education Advisory 
Body.91  
Therefore, the main element, which characterizes the period of 1999 -2002 had been 
the presence of the domestic veto players that put important obstacles on the path to 
fulfilling the conditions. However, this does not change the fact that relatively small but 
important steps had been taken by the coalition government that brings us to the 
conclusion that in spite of the unfavourable domestic conditions, the credibility and size 
of the reward-EU accession- triggered the political reforms. Rather than the material 
costs, the EU’s high credibility notably determines the process of EU conditionality by 
inciting the coalition partners to achieve further rule adoption.  
After the breakdown of the coalition government in 2002, the early elections were 
held in November 2002 that the DSP, ANAP, and MHP which formed the coalition 
government and run the country in the 1990s could not pass the ten percent threshold. 
The social democrat Republican People’s Party (CHP) received 19.4 percent of the votes 
and gained 178 seats. The pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) took 34.2 
% of the votes, winning 363 of the 550 seats in the parliament, which enabled the party 
to hold a parliamentary majority and allowed it to make constitutional amendments 
without the necessity of referendum.92 Therefore, the Justice and Development Party 
emerged as the sole winner of the general elections and the only opposition party had 
been the Republican People’s Party. Apart from the previous coalition government, since 
the AKP gained enough seats to established the government and to make constitutional 
amendments, and the CHP remained as the only opposition party supported the reforms, 
the number of domestic veto players diminished, which immediately accelerated the rule 
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adoption process by taking a wide range of harmonization packages.93 What distinguished 
the AKP from its successor conservative parties, particularly Welfare Party, is that the 
incumbent AKP government had always expressed its enthusiastic about making Turkey 
an EU member. Even though previous conservative parties, which were banned from the 
Turkish politics by the military, clearly expressed their opposition to close Turkey-EU 
Relations,94 no resonance had been shown by the AKP government regarding the Turkey-
EU Relations.95 As shown in the progress Reports of 2003 and 2004, Turkey has 
undergone a series of reform process by harmonizing reform packages for the 
improvement of democratic structure to comply with EU conditions. The reforms made 
by the AKP government vary on cross-issue areas. Since the government introduced a 
wide range of reforms and harmonized the Turkish domestic legal system in line with the 
EU, as supposed by the EIM, the degree of domestic compliance had been notably high. 
The AKP government starting from 2002 always attached a significant importance 
to the EU as an important anchor for democratic consolidation in Turkey. The ruling elites 
starting from 2002 until 2007 seriously addressed the demands of the EU by taking 
encouraging political reforms in line with the EU. As the material benefits of the EU 
conditionality in this period exceeded the domestic cost of compliance of the ruling elites, 
culminating the fulfilment of the conditions, nine harmonization packages ranging from 
different issue areas were adopted by the parliament to comply with the EU conditions, 
which apparently demonstrate the high commitment of the government. In this time 
period, there are multiple external and internal factors, which constituted favourable 
conditions for the adoption of these political reforms.    
First, the incumbent AKP government faced with low degree of domestic veto 
players as the ruling elites gained the parliamentary majority and the CHP stand as the 
only opposition party, securing the two third requirement of the parliament to pass the 
amendments. The high commitment of the AKP together with the low domestic veto 
players enabled itself to meet the EU conditions. At that point, it is reasonable to argue 
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that if the government is a rational actor aiming to maximize its own benefits, then what 
are the potential benefits of the AKP government that induced itself to fulfil the conditions 
besides the accession promise of the EU. While looking at the rule adoption and issue-
areas, one can argue that even though the government passed comprehensive 
harmonization packages ranging from the Penal Code to Labour Law, the dominant issue 
where the government particularly tried to fulfil the conditions in line with the EU had 
been the civilian control of the military, as the rule adoption was insufficient in the first 
sub-period. 
 Since the preference of the EU and Turkey over the role and power of the Turkish 
military perfectly matches, we see a high degree of compliance with the conditions until 
2007. However, it is worth mentioning that the compliance with the EU conditions 
regarding the military issues is costly as Turkey has always been a militaristic state and 
the military had been regarded as the most trusted institution among the Turkish people. 
However, despite of the size of the cost of compliance, the AKP government successfully 
fulfilled the conditions required by the EU. The main rationale lies on the fact that the 
military combined with the judiciary had been two major institutions, which traditionally 
define themselves as the ‘protector of the secular-Kemalist nature of the Turkish state’ 
against the potential threats stemming from the ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘national 
unity’.96 The historical examples clearly show that if the military finds itself in a situation 
where a certain group of people or political party was posing threats on the security of the 
Turkish state, then the ultimate result would possibly be the military take-over for the 
sake of the continuation of the main principles of the state. As the Kurdish and religious 
parties mostly faced with the military take-over, the AKP strategically focused on the 
demand of the EU with regards to demilitarisation of the military in order not to have 
same fate with its successors, the Welfare Party or the Virtue Party. Thus, the utilisation 
of the EU conditions by the AKP government for the governmental interests resulted in a 
high degree of commitment, compliance and credibility.  
Second, the EU’s credibility to the Turkey’s membership was notably high as 
Turkey was first declared a candidate state at the Helsinki Summit and then accession 
negotiations were opened in 2005 despite of the fact that the EU never set a clear 
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membership date for Turkey. The roadmap for Turkey after 1999 was therefore clear. As 
long as Turkey meets the conditions, then there is nothing left for the EU to exclude the 
country from the accession process, which was proved in 2004 when the European 
Commission stated that considering the recent reforms undertaken by Turkey, accession 
negotiations will be opened at the latest 2005. While looking at the Progress Reports until 
2007, one can easily argue that the Commission apparently stressed the importance of the 
all harmonization packages by emphasizing the efforts of the government to fulfil the 
conditions in order to open the accession negotiations.  Therefore, one of the important 
leverages or anchors behind the fulfilment of the conditions was the ‘European Union’ 
and its promise of opening the accession negotiations.97 The possibility of the accession 
of negotiations as the ultimate reward or ‘carrot’ constituted the main engine for Turkey 
to undertake domestically high costs of political and legal reforms. Thus, the rule adoption 
or reform process taken by the first coalition and then the incumbent government from 
1999 to 2007 perfectly illustrates the EU’s anchor for the democratization of the country 
based on the external incentives model of reinforcement by reward. As the reward-
accession- was clearly presented by the EU by arguing that once the conditions were met, 
accession negotiations will be realized, this incited the ruling elites to comply with even 
high costly issues.  In 2004, the Commission ultimately announced the opening of the 
accession negotiations with Turkey by the end of 2005. The EU’s credibility was 
considerably high from 2002 to 2007, and reached its peak point when the accession 
negotiations opened with Turkey in 2005.The high commitment of the AKP government 
strengthened with the high credibility of the EU, absence of veto players and favourable 
domestic atmosphere, they all paved the path for the political reforms, resulting in a high 
degree of Turkey’s domestic compliance with EU conditions.  
Table 2: Turkish Political Reforms 2001-2007 
Date Type Amendments  EU’s response 
3 October 2001 1st Constitutional 
Package 
 
34 amendments to the 1982 
Constitution 
Initiatives had been 
taken to reform the 
judicial system and 
improve the efficiency 
as reported in the 
previous Regular 
Reports. The report 
welcomed the initial 
steps of Turkey to fulfil 
the conditions by 
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emphasizing the need 
of further reforms.  
1 January 2002  New Civil Code Gender equality in marriage 
Protection of the child and 
vulnerable persons  
The Report briefly 
mentioned the changes 
introduced in the field 
of gender equality and 
child protection. 
19 February 2002 1st Harmonization 
Package 
The amendments of Article 7 
and 8 of the Anti-Terror Law 
diminishing the restrictions on 
the freedom of expression 
Expanded detention rights of 
the detainees.  
 
The Commission 
extensively emphasized 
the point that 
untouched provisions 
of the Penal Code had 
been used by 
prosecutors to limit the 
freedom of expressions 
in spite of the 
amendments. The 
Commission 
underlined that 
prosecutors have 
tendency to use these 
articles to open a trial 
in particular issue 
areas. (Kurdish issue, 
freedom of press) 
 
In the reports, the issue 
regarding the right of 
detainees’ concerning 
the SSCs had been 
considered as an 
important 
development. 
9 April 2002 2nd Harmonization 
Package 
Strengthened the rights of the 
freedom of Association, 
Meetings and Demonstrations 
 
 
 
 
Not mentioned 
9 August 2002 3rd Harmonization 
Package 
Abolished the death penalty, 
except in times of war 
Introduced provisions for re-
trial 
Adopted Protocol 6 to the 
ECHR  
converting death sentences to 
life imprisonment, 
 Amended the Civil and Penal 
Code 
The Commission 
assessed the step 
concerning the retrial 
of cases as a ‘positive 
development’ but 
underlined that direct 
effect of the ECtHR 
still remains a concern.  
No emphasis on the  
death penalty in the 
section of the Judiciary 
was found but in other 
parts of the Reports, it 
had been highly 
emphasized.  
11 January 2003 4th Harmonization 
Package 
Revise the Penal Code for the 
freedom of speech 
Extended detainee rights 
Strengthened the safeguards 
against the ill treatment and 
torture 
The Commission 
attached a significant 
importance to the 
amendments made in 
the Penal Code 
regarding the ‘retrial’ 
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that had been found 
contrary to the ECtHR. 
 
The Report underlined 
the point that in spite of 
the improvement in the 
detainees’ rights, the 
functions and 
responsibilities of the 
SSCs had to be further 
brought in line with the 
EU. 
4 February 2003 5th Harmonization 
Package 
Expanded amendments for the 
retrial  
Lifted the criterion ‘the 
violation… is seen to have had 
consequences that cannot be 
compensated’ from Law. 
 
The Commission 
clearly expressed the 
need for the re-trial 
concerning the SSCs 
by referring to the 
ECtHR as a reference 
point in almost all 
Progress Reports.  
19 July 2003 6th Harmonization 
Package 
Article 1 on the definition of 
terrorism amended replacing 
the prerequisite of the use of 
violence with ‘constituting a 
crime’ 
Lifted the provision that 
‘inappropriate names to the 
national culture and customs 
cannot be given’ 
 
 
 
No mention was found. 
7 August 2003 7th Harmonization 
Package 
Regarded torture and ill 
treatment as urgent 
Revised the duties and 
functions of the NSC in a 
civilian manner 
Revised the jurisdiction of the 
military courts over the 
civilians 
The Commission 
particularly assessed 
the developments 
regarding the NSC in a 
special chapter, which 
shows the importance 
of the issue for the 
democratization and 
demilitarisation of 
Turkey in line with the 
EU. 
 
The end of the military 
jurisdiction over the 
civilians has been 
considerably addressed 
by the Commission as 
a serious concern over 
the independence and 
democratic judicial 
system of Turkey. The 
Commission 
underlined necessity to 
make further reforms in 
this particular issue.  
14 July 2004 8th Harmonization 
Package 
The Law lifting the death 
penalty was adopted 
Charges converted to life 
sentence 
The Commission 
stressed that the 
abolishment of the 
SSCs and replaced by 
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Revise the Higher Education 
Council and NSC 
the Heavy Penal Courts 
would improve the 
efficiency of the 
judicial system, that 
has been frequently 
criticized by the EU. 
 
  
12 April 2006 9th Harmonization 
Package 
The Law on Foundations was 
approved. 
Draft Law on the Ratification 
of the UN Convention against 
corruption  
The Law on Ombudsman 
approved by the Parliament 
 
The Commission 
greatly stressed the 
importance of the 
harmonization of the 
judicial system in line 
with the international 
law and the EU. 
Therefore, changes 
taken for the 
international law had 
been regarded as 
important development 
to democratize the 
judicial system and 
enhance the 
independence, 
impartiality and 
efficiency.   
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Secretariat General for EU Affairs, Political Reforms in Turkey, 
Ankara 2007 Available at http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/pub/prt.pdf 
First of all, one of the key concerns of the EU over the democratization of Turkey 
had been the presence and functions of the SSCs, which involved a military judge 
responsible for reviewing the political crimes.98 The existence of a military judge in the 
SSCs was highly criticized by the Commission by arguing that this violated the 
‘independent and impartial tribunal’ of the individuals, as Turkey is a part of the Council 
of Europe and desires to join the EU.99  In this respect, the Commission underlined that 
further reforms were particularly needed. In 1999, as a first step, the structure of the SSCs 
removing the military judge, was amended by the constitutional changes, which requires 
the re-trial of the defendants, including Abdullah Öcalan- the leader of the PKK. The 
Commission clearly emphasized that: 
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 ‘Such a reform should clearly improve the functioning of the SSCs, even if there are still some doubts 
about the full rights offered to the defendants in these courts. According to Justice Ministry sources, more 
than 7000 cases are awaiting trial by SSCs.’100 
In spite of the removal of the military judge, there had been no further progress in 
2000 for the improvement of functioning and responsibilities of the courts that they have 
to be harmonized with the European standards.101 In 2001, however, the constitutional 
amendments made in 1999, became operational that civilian judges now will be appointed 
that was not sufficient enough. The Commission still kept underlying the point that the 
concern over the fair trial in the SSCs has remained.102 As a response to 2001 Progress 
Report of the Commission, the detainee’s rights covered by the SSCs had been improved 
with the removal of the last provision of the Article 16, which restricted the rights of 
detainees’ including, access to a lawyer and the requirement of the third person in the 
meetings between the detainee and his/her lawyer.103  Even though there had been further 
amendments, which constrained the functioning of the SSCs by the ‘Law on the 
Establishment and Prosecution Methods of State Security Courts’ and the ‘Law on the 
Fight Against Criminal organization’, they still kept serving its functions, which 
demonstrates that the amendments made in the structure of the SSCs remained limited to 
technical issues.104 Despite the fact that the EU systematically criticizes the existence of 
courts, which requires further drastic changes, the government remained reluctant to 
comply with as the immediate removal of the courts would be too costly. As stated in the 
2002 and 2003 Progress Reports, ‘Despite these limitations to the jurisdiction of State 
Security Courts,  
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‘The powers, responsibilities and functioning of the State Security Courts still need to be brought in line 
with European standards in terms of protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular 
the rights of defence.’105 
After the adoption and operational of the first harmonization package in February 
2003, as also underlined in the 2003 Progress Report, further development was the re-
trial of the all cases where the ruling of the SSCs had been found contrary to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, including the re-trial of four deputies of Democracy Party- 
Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Selim Sadak and Orhan Dogan, who were accused of supporting 
Kurdish separatism.106 After the re-trial process begun in March 2003, four formal 
deputies were released in 2004.107 As the Kurdish issue or separatism has always been an 
important issue for Turkey by claiming that this would endanger the territorial integrity 
and invisibility of the state as one of the most important national interests, the attempts 
taken by the AKP government for the democratization of the country demonstrate its 
willing to comply with the conditions, increasing its credibility for the implementation of 
reforms. The year, 2004, further increased the credibility and effectiveness of 
conditionality in the eyes of the EU as shown in the 2004 Progress Report that the existing 
of the SSCs, which had been frequently criticized by the EU starting from 1999, had been 
finally abolished with the harmonization package adopted in May 2004.108 Jurisdiction 
covered by the SSCs had been transferred to newly established Heavy Penal Courts 
including, such issues as organised crime, drug dealings and terrorist offences.109 The 
decision of removal the SSCs by the newly established AKP government, which draw a 
particular attention by the Kemalist-Secular cleavage in Turkey, demonstrates its willing 
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to fulfil the EU conditions, which not only increased the effectiveness but also credibility 
of the both parties during the process. 
Another key concern frequently emphasized by the Commission starting from 1999, 
had been the efficiency of the Turkish judicial system. A large of number of case load 
and long duration of trial proceedings decreased the efficiency of the system, which 
therefore requires further attempts as particularly stated by the Commission. In 2001 
Progress Report demonstrates that a wide range of tools and programmes was introduced 
by the coalition government for the training of judges and prosecutors on the basis of 
human rights, alternative measures for imprisonment and effectiveness of judiciary.110 
The Commission in particular raised the necessity of close cooperation with the Council 
of Europe in the field of human rights. During this time, training courses on human rights, 
language education and forensic medicine were given mostly by the Centre for Education 
and Training of Judges and Prosecutors.111 The establishment of ‘National Judicial 
Network’ project in 2002 aimed to increase the efficiency of the judicial system by 
providing information technology within the all units of the Ministry of Justice, which 
also contributed to the uniformity of the trial proceedings.112 
2002 and 2003 Progress Reports attached a significant importance to the 
establishment of Regional Courts of Appeal by arguing that even though there had been 
no progress reported by the government, the establishment of the courts would decrease 
the excessive caseload since the Supreme Courts have dealt with almost 500 000 cases in 
a year. This would also enable the judges and prosecutors to carry out a fair trial as their 
workload would be decreased.113 In 2004, the Law on the establishment of the 
Intermediate Courts of Appeal had been adopted by the Parliament but could not be taken 
into force due to the further necessary amendments concerning the provisions of the Penal 
Code.114  
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During this time, with the increase made in the number of judges and prosecutors, and 
juvenile courts, a slight decrease had been recorded in the trial proceedings. The 
Commission in its 2004 Report emphasized the point that after the two visits of expert 
advisory mission, they recorded a significant progress in the Turkish judicial system in 
line with EU standards during the period of October 2003 and July 2004.  
Another encouraging development achieved by the government to harmonize the 
legal system in line with the EU had been in the field of human rights and freedoms. In 
the Progress Reports of 2000 and 2001, the Commission clearly expressed its concern 
over the violation of human rights in Turkey by referring to the conclusions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which had been contrary to the Turkish domestic 
law. The Commission stressed the necessary of further arrangements for the re-trial of 
defendants and the protection of civil and political rights.115 The government in 2002 
recognized the ruling of the European Convention on Human Rights as a reference to the 
internal legal system, which would ensure the fair trial under ‘Article 6 of the ECHR’.116 
In 2003, the Article of the Turkish Constitution was further amended by the 
harmonization package, which states that the principle of supremacy of international and 
European treaties will be applied in the case of a contradiction between the domestic 
legislation and international treaties concerning the fundamental rights and freedoms.117  
Between the years of 1999 and 2007, the coalition government and then the AKP 
government demonstrated a great degree of compliance with EU conditions resulting in 
many changes and amendments in the Turkish legal system. In 2000 report, the 
Commission stated that ‘the Ministry of Justice had intensively worked on a plan 
establishing the judicial police and an Ombudsman’s office in line with the Copenhagen 
political criteria.’118 A new Civil Code covering such issues as gender equality, freedom 
of association and protection of child was adopted in November 2001 and became 
operational in January 2002.119 As shown in the 2003 Progress Report, the family courts 
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were established with the aim of providing necessary measures for the protection of child 
and adults. The amendment harmonizing the system of judicial records with the Article 1 
of the United Nations Convention on Children’s Rights was adopted. The age of children, 
who can be tried in juvenile courts, had been increased from 15 to 18.120 
In 2004, the Justice Academy was established. The number of judges and 
prosecutors, who was trained by the Academy had been gradually increased and new 
training courses concerning the European Convention on Human Rights were 
organised.121 The condition for the establishment of Juvenile Courts was amended in 2004 
for the purpose of increasing the number of courts in all cities. To increase the efficiency 
of family courts, there had been further progress by restricting the jurisdiction areas of 
the courts.122 Additionally, with the amendment made in the law, single judges, judges 
without children and under the age of 30 can now work in the Family Courts. The year, 
2004, can be considered as the time when the degree of compliance with EU conditions 
was at its peak point not only because of the quantity of rule adoption made by the 
government but also because of the quality of the issues that the government demonstrated 
a significant degree of fulfilment of conditions on the road to opening of accession 
negotiations. 
Between the years of 2005 and 2007, there had been still further progress reported 
by the Commission despite of the fact that accession negotiations started with Turkey. 
During this time, the number of judges had been increased. The new Penal Code 
introduced for the first time the concept of ‘cross-examination of witnesses’ and plea 
bargaining.123 The Ministry of Justice still continued to organize seminars with regards 
to fundamental rights and freedoms, and European Convention for the training of judges 
and prosecutors.124 In 2007, the Commission stated that some progress had been still 
achieved on the basis of the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code. There had been 
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efforts to digitalize the judicial system. Positive results of the National Judicial Network 
project had been reported. The recruitment of judges and prosecutors still continued.125 
As stated by the Commission: 
‘Overall, there has been some progress as regards the efficiency of the judiciary through implementation 
of adopted legislation and continued use of IT. However, tensions in the relations between the government 
and the judiciary have not been conducive to the smooth and effective functioning of the system. More 
needs to be done in terms of strengthening the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. Finally, there 
is no overall National Reform Strategy for the Judiciary or a plan to implement it.’126 
In the light of the External Incentives Model, the period that Turkey had undergone 
after 1999 can be described as a golden era of political conditionality. First of all, the 
model argues that the number of domestic veto players determines the effectiveness of 
conditionality. As shown in the Progress Reports of 1999, 2000 and 2001, the rule 
adoption taken by the coalition government remained limited due to the strong resonance 
of the MHP. Despite the fact that all parties agreed on the membership of Turkey, MHP 
demonstrated a particular resistance not to comply with EU conditions that rule adoption 
continued at a slower pace. However, when the AKP government came into power in 
November 2002 with a relatively high percent of electoral votes, the only opposition party 
in the Parliament was the CHP, which clearly supported the efforts of the AKP on the 
road to opening of accession negotiations. Moreover, the rule adoption, which particularly 
indicates the effectiveness of conditionality, had been found in the case of Turkey 
between the years of 1999 and 2007 when the government introduced a wide range of 
harmonization packages in line with modern EU standards. The important thing, here, is 
that the rule adoption does not only cover the low concern technical domestic issues that 
require a low degree of domestic cost of compliance, but also involves the high concern 
political issues such as the removal of SSCs, amendments in the Penal Code and the 
harmonization of domestic legislation with international treaties, which resulted in the 
effective EU conditionality policy. However, at that point, it has to be noted that there are 
some issues where the government demonstrated reluctance to comply with the 
conditions as stated by the Commission. The Commission predominantly stressed its 
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concerns over the Turkish judicial system with regards to independence of judiciary and 
therefore separation of power.  
In the Progress Reports, the Commission systematically stated that: 
 ‘There is continuing concern regarding the extent of the independence of the judiciary in practice. Pressures 
were exerted on judges and prosecutors, particularly in connection with prosecutions of state officials, for 
instance in relation to corruption cases. The fact that the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors, in 
charge of appointments and postings, is chaired by the Minister of Justice, puts into question the separation 
of powers between judiciary and executive.’127 
In almost each Progress Report published after 2003, there had been continuous 
emphasis on the importance of independence and impartiality of the Turkish judicial 
system. The reports particularly underlined the structure, responsibilities and functions of 
the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors by arguing that the increased control of the 
executive body over the judiciary endangers the separation of power resulting in a 
situation where the judiciary does not always act impartial on its decisions. Even though 
some provision in the Turkish Constitution guaranteed the independency of the judiciary, 
other provisions and more importantly the structure that the High Council has, weakened 
the functioning of the judicial system. In the words of the Commission: 
‘Appointment, promotion and discipline and, broadly speaking, the careers of all judges and prosecutors in 
Turkey are determined by the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors, which is chaired by the Minister 
of Justice and of which the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Justice is also a member. The possibility of 
removal and transfer to less attractive regions of Turkey by the Supreme Council may influence judges' 
attitudes and decisions. Aside from the composition of the Council itself, the influence of the executive is 
further enhanced by the fact that the High Council does not have its own secretariat and its premises are 
inside the Ministry of Justice building. The Council is entirely dependent upon a personnel directorate and 
inspection board of the Ministry of Justice for its administrative tasks.’128 
Furthermore, even though there had been some progress in the Penal Code 
harmonized with modern EU standards, the operational of the Code had been postponed 
because of the concerns over the organised crimes and freedom of expression.129 
Additionally, the inconsistent use and divergent interpretation of the articles of the Penal 
Code by public prosecutors on the basis of freedom of expression constituted a serious 
problem. In spite of the reforms undertaken by the government for the improvement of 
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the Penal Code, untouched articles of the Code had been used by the public prosecutors 
to open a case such issues as language course at universities.  
This ultimately weakened the transparency and unity of the judicial system. As 
stated in the 2003 report: 
 ‘There continue to be reports that the judiciary does not always act in an impartial and consistent manner. 
The principle of the independence of the judiciary is enshrined in the Turkish Constitution. In practice 
however, its independence is undermined by several 22 other constitutional provisions, which establish an 
organic link between the judiciary and the executive. The Constitution provides that judges and prosecutors 
shall be attached to the Ministry of Justice in so far as their administrative functions are concerned.’130 
Overall, as clearly expressed by the EU, the process of the rule adoption starting in 
1999 with the coalition government was notably accelerated with the incumbent AKP 
government when it came to the office in 2002. Despite the constitutional amendments 
made by the coalition government, the EU stated that they remained insufficient to fulfil 
the conditions and further reforms were needed particularly in the areas of the civilian 
control of the military, the Penal Code and the freedom of expression, where the 
preferences of the EU and Turkey demonstrate a clear divergence at most. In response to 
the demands of the EU, the ruling elites demonstrate a high degree of commitment with 
the conditions in compared to the coalition government, which raised the question of 
which factors played a key role in the acceleration of the rule adoption by the AKP 
government. One of the important variables that determine the degree of compliance was 
the ‘lack of domestic veto players’. As the government was formed by a single-majority 
and the only opposition party was the CHP; this enabled the ruling elites to pass a wide 
range of harmonization packages without referenda. More importantly, even though the 
CHP stand as the only opposition party with a weak power, the party still supported the 
government’s policies in line with the EU for the ultimate reward. On the other hand, 
divergent party priorities and policies among the coalition partners towards the EU 
membership in the 1990s put a serious obstacle on the way to the fulfilment of the 
conditions. Additionally, one of the key proponents for the fulfilment of the conditions is 
the size of the domestic costs for the government. While looking at the demands of the 
EU, they were mainly revolved around the military and the Penal Code as the product of 
the 1982 constitution that material cost of rule adoption for the government was high but 
the government was explicitly enthusiastic to comply with high costly issues stemming 
                                                            
130 European Commission, 2003, Ibid., p. 19-22 
42 
 
from the convergent preferences of the EU and the ruling elites. Additionally, as the EU 
clearly expressed that once Turkey fulfils the conditions, accession negotiations will be 
opened; this induced the target governments to comply with the EU conditions as they 
ensure that the reward will be paid at the end.  
The EU’s high credibility, which reached a peak point with the opening of the 
accession negotiations, increased the level of compliance by the ruling elites. Therefore, 
favourable domestic conditions combined with high EU credibility led to an increase in 
the fulfilment of the conditions on a wide range of issues, culminating the effectiveness 
of EU conditionality policy in the case of Turkey between the years of 1999 and 2007. 
The slowdown of EU conditionality: 2007-2011 
Turkey presents a mixed picture of EU conditionality in the post-2007 period. On 
the one hand, despite of the dominant literature arguing that the loss in EU’s credibility 
in the case of Turkey due to a number of EU level factors, will lead to a decrease in the 
fulfilment of the conditions; the process of the political reforms still continued but the 
pace of the rule adoption stalled after 2007. On the other hand, the government still aimed 
to fulfil the demands of the EU but in a different logic from the period of 1999-2007. 
Therefore, I will first examine the major EU-level and domestic level factors that led to a 
decrease in the speed of the political reforms and then I will analyse the ruling elites’ 
compliance with the EU conditionality in a critical way.  
As the ruling elites have been the main actors behind the rule adoption, the stance 
of the political parties in the parliament towards Turkey’s EU membership plays a key 
role whether they would support or oppose to the compliance with the requirements. The 
preferences and interests of the government notably determine the path and speed of EU 
conditionality. In this respect, even though the EU’s demands have always remained 
constant requiring mainly the functioning liberal democracy and the rule of law, the pace 
of the rule adoption in line with the EU has varied across the material costs of the ruling 
elites, the presence of the veto players and the EU’s credibility, weakening the 
commitment and compliance of the conditions. Considering the fact that the EU has 
frequently stressed the similar demands and the ruling elites took important steps to fulfil 
them in the first term of its office, the government’s will to comply with the conditions 
begun to decrease when the domestic veto players begun to become visible, increasing 
the cost of the compliance of the government. Thus, changes in the preferences of the 
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AKP government due to a number of domestic factors led to a visible decrease in the 
fulfilment of the conditions. 
After 2007, the domestic veto players within the Turkish politics, including the 
Turkish military composed of the secular-Kemalist legacy, the Constitutional Court and 
the organized societal opposition groups, begun to hear their voice and played a key role 
in the determination of the EU conditions.  First indicator of the tensions between the 
secular circles and the ruling elites comes with the presidential election in 2007. Ahmet 
Necdet Sezer’s official duration as president of the Republic of Turkey expired in May 
2007. At that time, it was argued that Prime Minister Erdoğan was planning to run for the 
presidential elections. However, his pro-Islamist background and religious rhetoric were 
highly criticized by the Kemalist-rooted Turkish military and secular segments of the 
society, which put an obstacle on his election.131 Instead of Erdogan, the Foreign Minister 
and Deputy Minister Abdullah Gül was nominated for the presidency by the AKP on 
April 24, 2007. Gül’s election as president also took serious opposition from the secular 
wing of the politics on the grounds that his wife wears a headscarf and opened a case 
against Turkey in the ECHR.132 Additionally, in the 1990s, Gül’s statements against the 
secular establishment of Turkey as a member of the Welfare Party led to a crisis. Thus, 
the election of Gül’s candidacy faced with a strong opposition coming from the secular 
elites.133  
During this time, despite of the criticisms coming from the opposition parties and 
civil society organizations, the AKP nominated Gül’s candidacy based on its 
parliamentary majority. After that, a number of massive demonstrations what has come 
to known ‘republic meetings’ was mobilized by the Association Ataturkist Thought 
(Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği), other civil society organizations and trade unions in order 
to protest Gül’s election. They particularly stressed the point that the election of pro-
Islamist figure for the presidency would undermine the separation of power. Thus, the 
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first meeting was held in Ankara in front of Anıtkabir, followed by İstanbul and İzmir.134 
This considerably demonstrates the increasing domestic resistance of the secular circles 
in the society towards the AKP’s increased conservative tendencies, which therefore 
forced the AKP to fight against the secular establishment for its survival rather than 
fulfilling the EU conditions. 
The presidential election took place on April 27 and the first round of the elections 
was boycotted by the opposition parties in the parliament. On the same day, a serious 
statement known as ‘e-memorandum’ was issued by the Turkish military135 emphasizing 
that ‘It is observed that some circles who have been carrying out endless efforts to disturb 
fundamental values of the Republic of Turkey, especially secularism, have escalated their 
efforts recently.’136 The statement particularly stressed the potential threats posing by the 
AKP government on the secular-Kemalist establishment of Turkey by stating that: 
 ‘The problem that emerged in the presidential election process is focused on arguments over secularism. 
Turkish Armed Forces are concerned about the recent situation. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish 
Armed Forces are a party in those arguments, and absolute defender of secularism. Also, the Turkish Armed 
Forces is definitely opposed to those arguments and negative comments. It will display its attitude and 
action openly and clearly whenever it is necessary.’137  
Tensions between the ruling elites and the Turkish military, which regards itself as 
the ultimate guardian of the secular establishment of Turkey, became apparent and raised 
the concerns of the AKP government on the role of the Turkish military since the military 
has the capacity to use all channel to dismiss the government out of power, as did before. 
Despite of the many political reforms undertaken by the government in order to prevent 
the Turkish military’s interference into politics from 1999 to 2007, this indicates the fact 
that the presence and power of the Turkish military as a protector of the secular character 
of the Turkish state, enabled the armed forces to exercise a domestic veto power on the 
way to the full democratization of the country in line with the EU.  
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The CHP as a secular-democrat opposition party appealed the decision to the 
Constitutional Court on the grounds that two third of the parliament was necessary to hold 
a presidential election, which the government could not meet. Four days later, the Court 
invalidated the election in the parliament by stating that two third quorum was necessary 
and lacked in the elections.138 In response to the Court’s decision, Prime Minister Erdogan 
withheld Gül’s candidacy and called for early elections that the AKP took 46.6 % of the 
votes and allocated 341 seats in the parliament, which enabled the party to form a single-
majority government and also enabled itself to pass the political reforms without the 
support of the opposition parties.139 During that time, on May 11, the 2007 constitutional 
package was passed by the AKP with the remaining veto of the CHP. The obstacles and 
increased resistance of the domestic veto players against the political reforms of the ruling 
elites forced the government to pass the 2007 constitutional amendment.140  The package 
revised the duration of the president decreasing from seven to five years with a change in 
the selection procedure from a parliamentary vote to a direct election. More importantly, 
as the requirement of two third constituted a serious problem for the AKP, now the 
package brought about 1/3 necessity quorum for all parliamentary business.141  
On May 25, the package was vetoed by President Sezer and sent back to the 
parliament. The package was again passed by the parliament without any change. 
Therefore, since the AKP had fewer than two third of the seats in the parliament, the 
package could not be adopted and eventually a referendum was held on October 21. The 
package, therefore, took the 69 % of the votes in favour and 31% against.142 Apart from 
the 2007 constitutional package, previous package presented by the AKP was adopted 
without any further problem since the CHP was the only opposition party with a weak 
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power in the parliament and more importantly, the party was not opposed to the changes 
made in line with the EU. However, after 2007, the CHP as a social-democrat party, has 
been opposed to the constitutional changes adopted by the AKP on the grounds that 
political reforms had been achieved not for the fulfilment of the EU conditions but for 
strengthening the political power and continuation of the ruling elites. Therefore, the 
demands of the EU based on the democratization of the country had been instrumentalized 
by the AKP government for the government’s own interests, which led to decrease in the 
credibility of the conditionality.  
In 2008, the tension between the secularists and the conservative wing had been 
worsened with the efforts of the AKP to lift the ban on the headscarf at universities. The 
constitutional amendment, which enables women to wear headscarf at universities, was 
passed by the parliament with a strong opposition of the CHP by arguing that this was a 
further step taken by the government to eliminate the main principles of the Turkish state 
by using the EU accession process.143 The resonance shown by the opposition groups on 
the grounds that the AKP government has been posing a serious threat to the secular-
Kemalist character of the state, came to the forefront with the closure case against the 
AKP in 2008. According to the Turkish Constitution,  the Constitutional Court decides 
upon the party closures on the grounds that if the party is engaged in activities against the 
main principles of the Turkish state.144  On March 14, 2007, Turkey’s top prosecutor of 
the Court of Cassation opened a case for the closure of the Islamist-rooted incumbent 
AKP government and a ban on 71 politicians from political activities by accusing the 
party of becoming the ‘focal point of anti-secular activities’.145 Even though since the 
1960s, mostly Islamist and Kurdish parties have been faced with a shutdown by the courts 
on the grounds that they were posing a threat to the fundamental principles of the Turkish 
state, it was for the first time that a single-majority government faced with a closure case. 
Additionally, the Welfare party and the Virtue Party as the successors of the AKP had 
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been also shut down by the court for anti-secular activities.146 According to the Turkish 
Constitution, to close a party, a qualified majority is must that seven members of the Court 
out of 11 have to reach a consensus for a dissolution ruling.147 However, Haşim Kılıç, the 
court chairman and chief justice stated that: 
"I hope the party in question will evaluate this outcome very well and get the message it should get. The 
verdict on cutting treasury aid has been given because of members who decided that the party was the hub 
of anti-secular activities but not seriously enough [to close the party]."148 
Six members of the Court voted in favour of the closure that the court decided not 
to close the party but fined.149 Thus, the closure case presents a good indicator of the 
ongoing tensions between the secular-Kemalist cleavage and pro-Islamist parties. The 
AKP as a conservative party, has been mostly accused of threating the secular 
establishment of Turkey by the military, which was strengthened with the presidency 
election last year that the military expressed its opposition to Gül’s nomination because 
of his Islamist background and with the efforts of the AKP for the lifting the headscarf 
ban at universities. Even though the AKP as a liberal-conservative party clearly stated 
that the party will be committed to promoting EU rules and principles based on 
democracy and the rule of law, the clash between the secular-Kemalist elites and the new 
emerging conservative middle class have been apparent after 2007 when the domestic 
veto players exercised their power on the ruling elites, which increased the domestic 
material costs of the government and therefore decreased the effectiveness of the 
conditions. The Constitutional Court as a judicial veto player and the Turkish military as 
a political veto player as the main guardians of the fundamental principles of the Turkish 
state constituted the main challenge that the incumbent government has faced with. 
Moreover, the 2008 closure case paved the way for the 2010 constitutional changes 
with regards to the amendments for party closures. The EU frequently expressed the 
necessity of the revision of the constitution into a civilian democratic adoption. The AKP 
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remained as the main supporter of the changes by arguing that political reforms and the 
adoption of the Constitution would further boost the EU accession process and therefore 
the compliance of Turkey with the conditions. However, the CHP demonstrated a strong 
resonance towards the constitutional changes on the grounds that this would enable the 
government to base its conservative power. As put by Müftüler-Baç, this creates a sort of 
paradox for the CHP. On the one hand, the party finds itself in a situation that it might be 
represented as the opponent to the democratic reforms. On the other hand, this might lead 
to an increase in the power of the AKP, resulting in an illiberal authoritarian 
democracy.150 The date of the 2010 constitutional referendum was also meaningful, as 
scheduled on September 12- same date with the 1980 take-over since the AKP particularly 
supported the constitutional changes based on the rhetoric that the 1982 constitution was 
a product of the military coup. Hence, Turkish people voted yes by 52 of the votes and 
voted no by 48 of the votes.151  
In 2008, the increased emphasis of the executive over the role of the military as a 
threat on its government had become apparent through the investigation made on so-
called ‘the alleged ultra-nationalist Ergenekon network’. In 2010, the Balyoz 
(Sledgehammer) case was also initiated, which was later merged with the Ergenekon case. 
Both networks were accused of engaging in activities to plot a coup against the 
democratically elected AKP government, and to plan assassinations and bomb attacks.152 
While the process started with the arrests of the high-ranking military members, including 
both active and retired, immediately spread to the opposition groups such as journalists, 
academics and civil society organisations.153 In this respect, investigations and trial 
proceedings were highly criticized by the EU on the grounds that the judicial system 
failed to conduct a fair trial. It was to be proved that the prosecution investigations turned 
to be based on fabrications. More importantly, the ‘specially authorized courts’ 
established in place of the SSCs, were the main authorities behind the trial proceedings 
by extending the duration of the custody, prevented the defendants from contacting more 
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than one lawyer, conducting research without court decision and catching the private 
interviews between the attorney and defendant.154 Both cases present a good illustration 
of the strategy of the incumbent government after the constitutional crisis, the closure 
case and increased societal opposition. 
As the visibility of the domestic veto players increased and the AKP perceived 
possible threats and challenges particularly coming from the military and the judiciary as 
the main guardians of the secular character of the Turkish state on the path to its 
government, this led to a growing control of the executive over the judiciary, violating 
the independence of the trial proceedings. The mistreatment, long unfair trial proceedings 
and fabricated proofs increased the questions of the real aim of the investigations as they 
clearly aimed to repress the secular opposition groups. Therefore, the increased struggle 
between the ruling elites and the opposition groups led to the arrestment and 
imprisonment of the secular opposition groups, which particularly decreased the power 
and role of the Turkish military in politics.155 The legislation, which allowed the civilian 
courts to try military members had been passed by the parliament in 2009 as a first step 
over the demilitarisation of the politics after the events of Ergenekon and Balyoz. As put 
by the Progress Reports, Protocol on Cooperation for Security and Public Order 
(EMASYA)- the right of the military to carry out operations against domestic security-
based threats without the necessity of approval of the civilian authority- had been 
abolished in 2010.156 Thus, the ruling elites predominantly focused on the domestic veto 
players and societal opposition groups, composing of the secular Turkish military, 
journalists, academics and civil society organizations through the judicial investigations 
conducted by the specially authorized courts, which raises the arguments that the 
incumbent government has demonstrated authoritarian tendencies.   
Therefore, the attempts of the ruling elites all paved the way for the increased 
resistance of the secular opposition groups against the AKP government by arguing that 
the ruling elites after 2007 have certain tendencies towards authoritarianism, which 
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ultimately decreased the level of compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria based 
on liberal democracy and the rule of law.  The apparent resistance of the secular groups 
against the strengthened electoral power of the ruling elites after the 2007 elections, led 
to a slowdown in the fulfilment of the EU conditions as the domestic costs of compliance 
begun to increase, combined with a loss of the EU’s credibility. In this respect, the ruling 
elites particularly begun to concentrate on the government’s own interests for the sake of 
its continuation rather than meeting the EU conditions, which would put certain obstacles 
on the base of the government’s power. 
Despite of the electoral victory of the AKP government, the closure case, the 
constitutional crisis, republic meetings, discussions over the headscarf, and Ergenekon 
and Balyoz cases all decreased the ruling elites’ will in continuing the fulfilment of the 
conditions, which made the government more defensive against the Kemalist-secular 
cleavage, resulting in a series of investigation process to repress the opposition group.157 
Therefore, as stressed by Hale, as the external reward offered by the EU could not 
supersede the domestic governmental interests, the ruling elites intentionally remained 
reluctant to meet the requirements.158 The credibility of EU conditionality was further 
weakened by the emergence of new domestic veto players in the internal politics. 
Secondly, the EU an external democracy promoter has been the main anchor or 
leverage for the political reforms in Turkey. While both parties highly committed itself 
to do everything necessary for the fulfilment of conditions from 1999 to 2007, the 
immediate alteration of the EU’s attitude towards Turkey’s membership led a loss of the 
EU’s credibility and created a situation where the ruling elites kept complying with EU 
conditions irrespective of the costs of rule adoption, and decreasing the potential of the 
receiving the reward. One of the reasons that led to a slowdown in the speed of the 
political reforms was the loss of the EU’s credibility.  
First of all, the reform process undertaken by the government to fulfil the conditions 
resulted in the Commission’s recommendation to start accession negotiations with 
Turkey. When the accession negotiations started with Turkey on October 3, 2005, it was 
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highly assumed that the credibility of conditions would reach its peak point as the EU 
clearly demonstrated that the reward was paid in the case of compliance. Apart from the 
prediction, after the opening of accession negotiations, the relationship between Turkey 
and the EU has undergone a new era on the grounds that Turkey is not eligible for the EU 
membership due to its ‘identity’, which arises the question of the boundaries of Europe. 
As of 2005, the exclusion of the country has been based on the concern over its 
Europeanness rather than political and economic concerns, which traditionally had been 
the legitimate excuse from the opponents of Turkey’s accession. As put by Öniş, 
‘European approach to Turkish-EU relations was that Turkey was economically 
backward and, at the same time, had failed to satisfy the criteria in relation to 
democratization and human rights necessary to qualify for full membership in the 
foreseeable future."159 
Despite the fact the EU clearly expressed ‘only Europeans can become a member 
of the EU’, the definition is to some extent problematic since nobody totally agrees on 
where Europe begins and ends. As particularly pointed out by Rumelili, the variation over 
the boundaries of Europe not only requires a certain definition on the basis of geography 
but also has to be supported and legitimized by a certain set of ‘rhetoric and practices’.160 
The Roman Empire and Christianity used for binding people together always refer to the 
common historical background of the Europeans.161 Öniş argues that "Christianity is a 
key component of European identity, even though it may not be its principal or overriding 
constituent."162 On the other hand, as Turkey always seeks to confirm its Europeanness 
in the eyes of Western part as the superior defining authority over the fundamental values 
and principles, this creates a sort of inferiority complex among Turkish people that 
becoming an EU member is therefore extremely significant. With the rejection of 
Morocco’s membership, the EU clearly closed the door without any further possibility on 
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the grounds that Morocco does not belong to European continent due to geographical 
considerations.163 However, in the case of Turkey, Turkey’s first application in 1959 was 
considered as ‘association’, which means that while Turkey is eligible for EU 
membership, political and economic situation that Turkey stands is not sufficiently 
enough to admit the country as a member. This demonstrates us that Turkey was regarded 
as a European country, which desires to join the Union.  
The instrument of candidacy, as emphasized by Rumelili, has been a good 
illustrator of how the Europeans notably construct the European identity and define the 
‘others’. By claiming that the applicant countries have to satisfy the conditions for the 
ultimate reward, the EU therefore puts itself in a superior position. Rumelili further argues 
that the Europeanness of the CEECs were not questioned by the Union. The EU even 
encouraged the integration of the continent with the expansion of the European territories 
to the East by arguing that the CEECs also share the common identity and history with 
us.164 The CEECs were not considered as ‘outside or other’ of the European Union while 
they had been distant from the continent for almost a century. Therefore, the rhetoric used 
by the supporters of the eastward enlargement, was based on the common historical and 
cultural share of the CEECs, which enabled the admission of them into the Union 
regardless of their relatively poor economy and politically weak political systems. 
However, Turkey’s eligibility for EU membership, which was reconfirmed in the 
Helsinki Summit by declaring Turkey as a legitimate candidate country, started to be 
questioned by some member states, which ultimately led to a decrease in the credibility 
of conditions. 
On 1 May 2004, ten mostly CEECs became the member of the EU, which was the 
biggest enlargement in the history of the EU. Despite the fact the EU aimed the gradual 
unification and integration of the CEECs in order to prohibit potential shortcomings 
stemming from the enlargement, there is no doubt that the membership of ten new 
member states, will substantially have an impact on the structure and functioning of the 
EU even though the EU institutionally prepared itself for the integration of those countries 
by signing the Nice Treaty. As the CEECs had different level of economic development 
and growth from the West, the Union was also suspicious about the Turkish entry, which 
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would constitute a high cost on the shoulders of the EU. Turkey described as a relatively 
poor economy with a huge young population would endanger the well-functioning EU 
institutions in the case of its membership. First of all, some member states clearly opposed 
to Turkey’s membership because of their national interests. France as the major 
beneficiary from the Common Agricultural Policy has been strongly opposed to Turkish 
entry to protect its own farmers. The CEECs are also opposed to Turkish entry as they 
have to share the structural and cohesion funds with Turkey.165 Germany as one of the 
corner states of the EU is also on the opposition side that the country as the largest net 
contributor to the EU budget, does not want to take further burden that Turkey would put 
on it. Additionally, Germany has particular reservations about Turkey’s membership with 
regards to free movement of young and large Turkish labour as the country has the largest 
Turkish immigrants.166 One of the most important obstacles that Turkey has faced, has 
been its population with almost 80 million as it would be the second most populous 
member state after Germany. Müftüler-Baç argues that Turkey was intentionally 
excluded from the process of institutional arrangements during the Nice Treaty, which 
redesigned the EU institutions for the big bang enlargement of 2004 as the EU institutions 
were designed for the six founding member states, which not only explain us why Turkey 
was not included in the process of rearrangement but also why the country was not listed 
among the candidate states in the Luxemburg Summit that Turkey was put in a particular 
position with the Accession Partnership Document in 2000.167 In the case of Turkey’s 
membership, the country with its 80 million population would also hold a high number 
of votes in the Council and seats in the Parliament. Since the size of the Parliament has 
been already fixed with the Nice Treaty, the seats for the new member states therefore 
would have to be taken by the other member states. More importantly, as argued by 
Müftüler-Baç, Turkey would have a chance to hear its voice through EU institutions.168 
With regards to the Council of Ministers, Turkey as the most populous country after 
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Germany, would have the opportunity to impact on the existence bargaining coalitions. 
Turkey would have relatively same bargaining power with Germany, France and Italy.169 
Therefore, utility-based explanations based on the possible impact of Turkey’s population 
over EU institutions constitute a major obstacle for its accession into the EU. Taking all 
the arguments into consideration, the Commission in its 2005 Negotiating Framework 
states that:  
‘The shared objective of the negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an open-ended process, the 
outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. While having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, 
including the absorption capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the 
obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures 
through the strongest possible bond’170 
There are two things here that have to be underlined. First, the term ‘absorption 
capacity’ or ‘enlargement fatigue’ used interchangeably refers to a particular situation 
where the EU is not fully capable of keeping its own development of institutional 
structure and policies. The term plays a key role to understand the changing attitude or 
strategy of the EU towards Turkey’s membership that the Commission inexplicitly refers 
to a new level of relations with Turkey, which is not obviously membership.  Second, 
despite from the CEECs, the open-ended process of Turkey-EU relations emphasizes the 
point that even if Turkey fulfils the conditions and completes the process successfully, 
the EU can assert the exclusion of Turkey from the enlargement.  The Commission further 
argues that: 
‘In accordance with the conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, the Union's capacity to 
absorb Turkey, while maintaining the momentum of European integration is an important consideration in 
the general interest of both the Union and Turkey. The Commission shall monitor this capacity during the 
negotiations, encompassing the whole range of issues set out in its October 2004 paper on issues arising 
from Turkey's membership perspective, in order to inform an assessment by the Council as to whether this 
condition of membership has been met.’171 
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2004 European Council with the recommendation of the Commission envisages the 
opening of accession negotiations with Turkey at the end of 2005. Immediately after the 
announcement of the Council, some EU member states clearly expressed their concerns 
over the Turkish entry. Austria and France have been the prominent figures, which arose 
the question of Turkey’s eligibility and possible problems that the country’s membership 
would put on the well-established EU institutions, policies and practices on the basis of 
material utility-based interests. Therefore, the coalition group particularly led by Austria, 
France and Germany suggests privileged partnership to Turkey instead of full EU 
membership.172 As stated by the Commission: 
‘While having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, if 
Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey 
is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond’173 
The EU, therefore, inexplicitly refers to a situation where Turkey-EU relations 
would be continued and deepened by institutional ties but not with full membership, 
which decreases the credibility of conditionality as Turkey started to question the 
legitimacy of conditions. Moreover, the statement given by the Union implying that 
Turkey’s membership will eventually depend on the internal policies and strategies of the 
EU based on its absorption capacity, raises the question of what will the EU do in the case 
of fulfilment of all 35 chapters of the acquis communautaire by Turkey. This perfectly 
overlaps with the idea of putting referenda adopted by France on possible Turkish entry, 
which was also adopted by the Austrian government. Given the fact there is a great degree 
of public opposition in France and Austria, and the strong resonance shown by some 
member states against the possible membership of Turkey, therefore, demonstrates that 
member states will always put extra obstacles to prevent Turkish entry, which makes the 
accession process ambivalent and credibility of conditionality low.  
Additionally, after the opening of accession negotiations, the credibility of EU 
conditionality was further weakened when some MS blocked certain chapters of acquis 
communautaire. During the negotiation process, opening and closing chapters depend on 
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the progress that the candidate country has shown on the fulfilment of conditions. In 
November 2006, Turkey was obliged to extend the Customs Unions to all new member 
states, including Cyprus stemming from the Additional Protocol that Turkey signed in 
1970.174 On 14-15 December 2006, after the rejection of Turkey to first recognize Cyprus 
and then to extend the Customs Union to Greek Cyprus, the Council decided on the 
suspension of negotiations on 8 chapters: free movement of goods, right of establishment 
and freedom to provide services, financial services, agriculture and rural development, 
fisheries, transport policy, customs union and external relations175. The Council stated 
that: 
“The Council decided in particular to suspend negotiations on eight chapters relevant to Turkey's 
restrictions with regard to the Republic of Cyprus, and will not close the other chapters until Turkey fulfils 
its commitments under the additional protocol to the EU-Turkey association agreement, which extended 
the EU-Turkey customs union to the ten-member states, including Cyprus, that joined the EU in May 
2004”.176  
Furthermore, since the decision on the process of the negotiations with the 
candidate country is taken by unanimity in an Intergovernmental Conference, which 
makes each member state a ‘veto player’, one-member state has the power to block 
opening or closing of the chapters at any stage of the negotiations. As Turkey rejects the 
extension of the Customs Union to the Greek Cyprus and since Turkey has an ongoing 
dispute over the recognition of the island; the chapters on freedom of movement for 
workers, energy, judiciary and fundamental rights, justice, freedom and security, 
education and culture, and foreign, security and defence policy were blocked by Republic 
of Cyprus on December 2009. One of the key concerns over the progress of the 
negotiations has been how Turkey will keep fulfilling the conditions if chapters can be 
unilaterally blocked at any stage of the negotiations by one member-state that Turkey has 
had a serious problem. Therefore, the Cyprus dispute of Turkey between Greece and the 
Republic of Cyprus will always put many obstacles for Turkey’s EU membership unless 
the problem had would be resolved.  
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Additionally, the statement given by Jean Claude Junker, President of the European 
Commission, further weakened the credibility of conditionality by arguing that ‘there will 
be no enlargement of the European Union for the next five years’. Thus, the domestic 
concerns of some MS and the ambivalent atmosphere created by the EU after the opening 
of accession negotiations in 2005 led to a sharp decrease in the credibility of 
conditionality. The decisions and negative signals given by the EU as a whole led to the 
postponement of Turkish membership in an indefinite time irrespective of Turkey’s 
efforts to comply with the conditions.  
All the factors examined above clearly demonstrate the fact that as the EU’s 
credibility begun to decrease immediately after the opening of the accession negotiations, 
the domestic veto players begun to become visible threating the survival of the 
government, and the misfit between the EU and Turkey become apparent; the ruling elites 
started to question that if Turkey completely fulfils the conditions, what kind of an excuse 
will the EU present to exclude Turkey from the enlargement process. At that point, one 
can assume that the incumbent government would sharply stop meeting the costly EU 
conditions in parallel to decrease in the EU’s credibility. However, the fact that EU anchor 
for the democratization of Turkey was weakened after 2007 does not mean that the 
government immediately stopped fulfilling the conditions. The incumbent government 
still kept complying with EU conditions. However, rather than comprehensive reform 
packages, which was the case between the years of 2002 and 2005; the government 
achieved partial progress in some issue-areas where the size of material cost remained 
small. In this respect, the important thing, here, is that despite the radical changes of the 
golden era, the compliance of the ruling elites after 2007 was based on the strategy of 
‘selectivity’. 
With regards to alignment of the domestic legislation in line with the EU, during 
the period of 2007 and 2011, there had been further reforms. First of all, the budget 
available to the Ministry of Justice was continuously increased.177 In 2009, a new Judicial 
Reform Strategy was adopted, which aimed to increase the efficiency, impartiality and 
independence of the judicial system that was considered as an important step by the 
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Commission.178 The number of judges and prosecutors was increased and their 
nomination process became more transparent by publishing the number of votes for each 
candidate on the official website of the Council.179 By changing the structure of the 
Appeal courts and establishing more chamber, the Ministry aimed to decrease the large 
number of caseload that the courts had faced with.180As shown in the Progress Reports, 
apart from the further reforms made by the government, the EU started to criticize the 
judicial system by emphasizing the point that there have to be more further reforms to 
enable the efficiency, impartiality and independency of the judicial system.  
The composition of the High Council had been frequently criticized by the 
Commission by referring to the structure, functions and responsibilities. As particularly 
stated in the 2008 and 2009 Progress Reports, there had been no progress for the 
improvement of the composition of the Council that impartiality of the judiciary had been 
still a serious concern.181 However, 2010 and 2011 Progress Reports stated that there had 
been further reforms for the democratization of the judicial system.182 First of all, the 
amendments made in the Constitution, which allowed the judiciary stuff to open a case 
against decisions by the Council dismissing from the profession, was a further step.183 
The professional and administrative support provided by the Ministry of Justice now 
replaced by the Secretariat General founded under the Council. As the judges and 
prosecutors will be appointed by the High Council to the Secretariat, this would decrease 
the potential intervention of the executive on the judiciary.184 The 2010 Constitutional 
referendum particularly underlined the concerns of the EU over the independence and 
impartiality of the Turkish judicial system. With the constitutional referendum adopted 
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on 12 September 2010, the number of the Assembly increased from seven to 22 judges 
and prosecutors for whom four will be appointed by the President.185 A separate 
secretariat was established, which was previously performed by the Ministry of Justice, 
by culminating in a situation in which the set-up and functions of the HSYK gained a 
more autonomous degree from the executive branch of the government. However, despite 
of the amendments for the improvement of the judicial system, the EU frequently 
addressed the point that the presence of the Minister of Justice as the President of the 
HSYK constitutes a key problem, which violates the full separation of powers by arguing 
that the control and pressure of the executive branch over the judiciary through the 
Minister of Justice might ultimately put pressures over the functioning and 
responsibilities of judges and prosecutors. Therefore, the changes made in the 
composition of the HSYK and the Constitutional Court can be regarded as an outcome of 
the EU conditionality by demonstrating its ability to force the target government-Turkey- 
to comply with EU conditions at some point. However, this also demonstrates the limits 
of the EU conditionality through which the domestic environment in the target 
government notably determines the degree of domestic compliance as in the case of 
Turkey when the expected utility of the political gains through rule adoption exceeds the 
expected costs of compliance, then the ruling elites are willing to meet the conditions 
such as demilitarization of the Turkish politics or changes in the Penal Code.  
Moreover, the decision taken by the Authorised Public Prosecutor on the detention 
of the Chief Public Prosecutor of Erzincan, who was accused of involving in alleged 
organized crime led to tension between the units of judiciary after the decision of the 
Council to revoke the powers of the authorised public prosecutor.186 This raised the 
question of impartiality and suspicion on fair trial of the judicial system. The 2011 Report 
underlined this point by arguing that the amendments under the Law on the High 
Prosecutors adopted in December 2010 changed the composition of the Council in a more 
pluralistic and representative way, which paved the way for less ministerial interference 
on the judicial system.187 Since 2011, the Minister of Justice and the Undersecretary are 
no longer veto players due to the changes made in appointment procedure and the ratio 
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of membership. In 2011, the High Council was made responsible for the functioning and 
responsibilities of the Inspection Board, which previously performed under the Ministry 
of Justice. The report emphasized that as the decision of the High Council on the 
disciplinary investigations depends on the approval of the Minister and the evolution of 
judicial stuff is highly centralized, this constitutes a major problem for the empowerment 
of impartiality and independence of the judicial system.188 
In 2009 Progress Report, the Commission expressed its concern over the quality of 
investigations regarding the high-profile cases by referring to alleged criminal network 
Ergenekon, the murder of three Protestants in Malatya and the murder of Hrant Drink- 
Turkish-Armenian journalist.189 The Report stressed the suspicion about the murder of 
Hrant Dink by arguing that in spite of the receiving credible death threats, the security 
forces had been failure to protect the life of Mr. Dink on the grounds of the report provided 
by the Prime Ministry Inspection Board. In 2010, the assassination of Hrant Drink had 
remained a major concern by giving the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights 
that the security forces, who got information about the credible death treats should have 
taken the necessary tools to prevent the murder of Dink and the quality of investigations 
had been ineffective so that this had been regarded as the violation of Article 2- right to 
life-, Article 10- freedom of expression-, and Article 13- right to an effective remedy. The 
Commission underlined the point that in spite of the reforms made in the field of 
fundamental rights and freedoms in line with the EU as shown in the previous reports, 
further reforms had to be taken.190 
The amendments changed in the composition and nomination of the Constitutional 
Court made it more democratic and in line with the EU standards as the Parliament started 
to be involved in the process of nomination of judges. Also, amendments prohibited the 
trial of civilians in military courts, increased the impartiality of the system.191 However, 
the presence of military-background of two judges constituted a problem for the 
democratic structure of the judicial system. In 2011, the introduction of the individual 
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application to the Constitutional Court on the grounds of violation of fundamental rights 
and freedoms by the public authorities, extended the powers of the Court resulting in a 
more fair and impartial trial procedure.192 The 2011 report stressed that in spite of the 
amendments made in the Constitutional Court through the 2010 referendum, which 
extended the normal membership of the Court, still remained inadequate due to the 
selection procedure of its members. The Report stated that: ‘The current election process 
in the Assembly does not fully guarantee the Court's political impartiality. At the same 
time, the President of the Republic plays an over-dominant role in the appointment 
process’193 
Analysing the rule adoption in the target government is one of the ways to see the 
commitment of the ruling elites and the effectiveness of EU conditionality. However, 
backslidings in the target government can be another way to see the yearly changes of the 
slowdown in the political reforms as in the case of Turkey that the issue of freedom of 
expression is one of them as frequently expressed by the EU. The freedom of expression 
has been particularly important after 2007 when the reforms taken by the ruling elites 
started to be reversed. Despite the fact that a wide range of reforms had been adopted in 
the fields of human rights, fight against torture and freedom of expression by changing 
the Penal Code in line with the EU, the units of the government including the judiciary 
system had been reluctant to implement those reforms. As put by Aydın-Düzgit and 
Keyman, the number of applications to the ECtHR in 2011 had doubled the average 
number of the applications between the years of 2005 and 2010 concerning the issues 
respectively a fair trial, property rights, freedom of expression and ill treatment.  
The EU clearly expressed its concern arguing that the main problem with freedom 
of expression and therefore the Penal Code lies on the fact that even though encouraging 
steps had been taken through the harmonization packages during the golden era of the 
political conditionality, untouched provisions of the Penal Code had been intentionally 
used by judges and prosecutors to restrict the free speech and to open a trial mostly on 
the basis of the high concern political issues such as territorial integrity or national unity, 
which ultimately limits the effectiveness of EU conditionality. This also supports the 
argument that when such reforms may pose certain obstacles on government’s interests, 
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then the government might be reluctant to either comply with the conditions or implement 
them, which leads to a loss of EU conditionality. Therefore, national interest in the context 
of Turkey such as territorial indivisibility or national unity has been one of the most 
important obstacles over the fulfilment of the conditions.  
Overall, in spite of the expectation that the opening of the accession negotiations 
would further trigger the political reforms, the incumbent government still continued 
fulfilling the conditions but at a slower pace due to a number of EU-level and domestic 
level factors. Even though the EU proved to be a credible actor by showing that the EU 
pays the reward if the target government complies with the required conditions, the 
opening of the accession negotiations decreased the effectiveness of conditionality as the 
EU’s rhetoric towards Turkey’s membership begun to drastically change.  
While looking at the rule adoption during the process of 2007 and 2011, one can 
argue that even though there had been further progress for the improvement of the judicial 
system in line with the EU, the issues amended by the government mostly remained to 
‘low concern technical issues’ which did not require a high degree of domestic cost for 
the government as argued by the EIM. The changes regarding the gender equality, 
consumer protection or the increase in the number of judges and prosecutors demonstrate 
us that the government still remained reluctant to comply with issues, where the expected 
cost of compliance is higher than the expected utility of benefits or where the changes 
may pose obstacles on the base of its power such as the structure of the High Council or 
impartiality of the judicial system. Therefore, the material rule adoption starting from 
2007 was mostly based on the strategy of ‘selectivity’. The selection of reforms to comply 
with by the government depends on the issue areas, which cannot put challenges on the 
survival of the government.  
As the domestic veto players come to the forefront after 2007, increasing the costs 
of the rule adoption on the path to fulfilling the conditions, the ruling elites mostly 
concentrated on the survival of its own government. The increase in the number and 
power of the domestic veto players, including the military, the judiciary and societal 
opposition group led to a decrease in the government’s compliance with the EU 
requirements. The military clearly expressed its concern over the secular character of the 
Turkish State by issuing a statement known as e-memorandum on its official website.  
The Ergenekon and Balyoz cases represent a good illustration of the threats that the 
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government may face. The judiciary as one of the pillars of the protector of the Turkish 
state demonstrated its concerns as well through the 2007 constitutional crisis, the closure 
case and headscarf issue. Therefore, the increased resistance of the oppositional groups 
towards the ruling elites’ policies showing authoritarian tendencies, increased the 
domestic costs for the government and forced itself to take further judicial amendments, 
resulted in the 2010 Constitutional referendum, which made the closure procedure 
complicated. The AKP government, therefore, pragmatically instrumentalized the EU 
conditions for the elimination of the potential internal veto players on the path to its 
legitimated electoral power.  
The reverse of EU conditionality: 2012-present 
While the material rule adoption gradually stalled in the post-2007 period, this was 
drastically reversed after 2012 when the preferences and priorities of the EU and Turkey 
begun to diverge and ruling elites particularly concentrated on the continuation of its own 
survival due to internal challenges that they have been facing. In spite of the fact that 
EU’s credibility was already weakened after the opening of accession negotiations, the 
ruling elites still tried to comply with the conditions at least a slower pace, which 
ultimately brings us to the conclusion that the reverse of the political reforms cannot be 
solely explained by the EU’s weakened leverage. As put by Müftüler-Baç, after 2013, the 
incumbent AKP government had to deal with a strong societal opposition and political 
struggles stemming from the Gezi event and corruption scandal, resulting a serious 
decline in the fulfilment of the EU conditions.194   
In 2013, Gezi Park protests begun with the plans of the Municipality to build a 
shopping mall in place of the Gezi Park and then rapidly turned into a first organized 
social movement in the history of Turkey to protest the authoritarian policies of the 
government.195 The protestors argued that authoritarian policies of the government have 
been restricting their rights and freedoms, and threating the secular character of the state. 
The movement, however, turned into a different dimension when the tear gas and water 
cannon had been used by the police to disperse the protestors what Erdogan called them 
as ‘a few looters’ and the movement as ‘undemocratic’ by accusing the CHP of provoking 
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the protestors. Furthermore, social media platforms highly used by the protestors to share 
information and to update the news through photographs and networks, were also 
criticized by Erdogan calling them ‘menace’.196 The apparent and increased resonance of 
the societal opposition proved by the Gezi Park increased the tension between the two 
major camps, secularists and the Islamists. Society as an important veto player 
demonstrates a strong resistance on the path to government’s policies, which resulted in 
the excessive use of force by the police and later the Constitutional amendments towards 
more illiberal tendencies that received serious criticism by the EU. Therefore, the ruling 
elites not only stopped complying with the EU conditions but also lost the gains achieved 
in its first term in office.  
The resonance against the government’s policies was also shown by the Turkish 
judiciary through the 17/25 December investigations. The corruption scandal broke out 
in 2013 with the investigations conducted by İstanbul Public Prosecutor Zekeriya Öz, 
who also conducted trial proceedings in the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases against the 
secular opposition groups.197 Zekeriya Öz was the prominent prosecutor taking legal 
measures against the secular-Kemalist opposition groups in the AKP government. 
However, the corruption case against the government, including politicians from the 
AKP, the sons of the three cabinet members, high-ranking state officials and 
businesspeople demonstrates that for the first time, the opposition voices did not come 
from the secular elites but from the government’s previous ally, Gulen movement, who 
apparently supported the AKP since the beginning by securing important positions in the 
state institutions, mostly the judiciary and the Ministry of the Interior.198 Erdogan called 
the investigations as ‘judicial coup’ trying to plot a coup against the democratically 
elected government. Therefore, when the interests of both parties begun to clash and 
cannot overlap with each other as they used to, the judicial system under the control of 
the Gulen movement begun to use its veto power against the ruling elites. Thus, after 
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2013, it has become apparent that the internal material costs of the ruling elites begun to 
increase drastically, threating its democratically elected government with the emergence 
of new veto players that put obstacles on the path to fulfilling EU conditions since the 
government has to deal with the parallel structure to base its political power. However, 
the tools to cope with the parallel structure, including dismissal or suspension of the state 
servants or closure of the companies engaged in activities with the movement, have been 
hardly criticized by the EU violating the principles of democracy. Increased costs of 
domestic problems that the incumbent government has faced with, therefore diminished 
the level of compliance with EU conditions. More importantly, the gains of the golden 
era regarding the democratization of Turkey in line with the EU through EU 
conditionality got dramatically reversed.  
The conclusions of the period of 2007 and 2011 remained almost same for the last 
period with a remarkable difference after 2014 when the Commission predominantly and 
frequently expressed its concern over the recent developments in the judicial system. 
Progress Reports starting from 2012 highly criticized the situation that the judiciary 
system finds itself. Even though further progress had been reported by the Commission 
regarding the efficiency of the system, amendments made in the legislation raised the 
concerns over the impartiality and independence. In the words of the Commission: 
‘There has been backsliding in the past year, in particular with regard to the independence of the judiciary 
which represents a significant challenge to the overall functioning of the judiciary. The extensive changes 
to the structures and composition of high courts are of serious concern as they threaten the independence 
of the judiciary and are not in line with European standards.’199 
Despite the fact that important steps had been taken by the ruling elites to trainee 
judges and prosecutors by organizing a wide range of seminars in cooperation with the 
ECHR, the Commission particularly addressed the threat of the executive’s role over the 
judicial system stating: 
‘The Justice Academy is responsible for pre-service and in-service training of candidate judges and 
prosecutors. Since the February 2014 legislative changes, the President of the Academy and deputies have 
been appointed by the executive, which is threatening the independence of the Judicial Academy. The 
human and financial resources of the judiciary seem proportionate to the challenges it faces.’200 
                                                            
199 European Commission, (2016), ‘Turkey progress Report’, p. 17, Access 15 June 2017, Available at 
http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/pub/2016_progress_report_en.pdf 
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The Commission in 2012 reemphasized the same point as done in the previous 
Progress Reports such issues as the composition of the High Council, the interference of 
the executive body over the judiciary such as ‘Deniz Feneri case’, and violation of the 
principle of ‘equality of arms’.201 As regards the fundamental rights and freedoms, despite 
the fact that there had been significant progress over the democratization of legislation in 
line with the EU, which had been also readdressed by the Commission in the previous 
Progress Reports, judges and prosecutors failed to effectively apply the international 
conventions in the case of a conflict between domestic law and the international 
agreements.202 The concern over the High Council had been underlined in each Progress 
Report. In the words of the Commission: 
   ‘The HSYK is the key institution managing the judiciary. The Council is independent in 
managing a budget of EUR 18.5 million. There was no progress in solving the persistent 
problem of the influence of the executive over the HSYK, in particular following the 
legislative changes of 2014 strengthening the powers of the Minister of Justice within the 
HSYK and the subsequent staff changes in the HSYK. As ex officio members, the Minister 
of Justice, acting as President of the Council, and his undersecretary continue to have 
substantial influence over the work of the HSYK. The HSYK is therefore widely perceived 
to be the executive’s main means of controlling the judiciary. More transparency in the 
HSYK’s work and strict adherence to procedures are needed to strengthen not only the 
Council’s credibility but also public trust in the judiciary.’203 
The 2016 Report further argues that the pressure and interference of the executive 
body over the judiciary had been further worsened after the July coup attempt that a 
number of judges and prosecutors suspected from conspiring with the Gulen movement, 
had been dismissed from their profession, which is a good illustrator of how high degree 
of domestic costs of compliance determines the effectiveness of conditionality. Following 
the coup attempt, 3508 judges and prosecutors had been suspended by the High Council, 
and 3390 had been detained.204 The Commission emphasized the point that: 
                                                            
 
201 European Commission, (2012), ‘Turkey Progress Report’, p. 13-17 Access 25 June 2017, Available at 
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202 Ibid. 
 
203 European Commission, (2016), Ibid., p. 17-20 
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‘Following the mass dismissals of judges and prosecutors in the aftermath of the attempted coup, the 
appointment of new recruits in large numbers within two weeks has raised concerns about the selection 
procedure and their professional quality.’205 
Therefore, as the Gulen movement has been constituting a major challenge on the 
survival and continuation of the government, which is the primary governmental interest, 
the incumbent government stopped complying with EU conditions as the expected costs 
of compliance greatly exceeds the expected benefits of the reward. As the government is 
the major authority to decide on whether the government will continue fulfilling the 
conditions, unfavourable domestic conditions, and threats diminished the effectiveness of 
conditionality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
205 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
The thesis aims to analyse the effectiveness and credibility of the strategy of 
political conditionality used by the EU for the democratization of the target states in line 
with EU norms and standards. The thesis analyses EU conditionality by applying the 
external incentives model based on the data deprived from the Progress Reports prepared 
and published by the Commission from 1999 to 2016.  
Political conditionality as one of the most important foreign policy instruments of 
the EU for the democratization of the target states, emerged aftermath of the Cold War 
Era with a specific aim that re-unification of the continent would be achieved resulting a 
stable and secure continent. Rather than using coercive measures, the strategy has been 
based on the idea of ‘reinforcement by reward’, which induces target governments to 
comply with conditions in exchange of a certain reward. Despite the fact that the strategy 
of conditionality fully worked in the case of the CEECs, resulting in their EU 
membership, EU conditionality policy has faced with certain obstacles and challenges in 
the case of Turkey, which led to ‘backslidings’. Turkey as an official candidate, which 
desires to join the EU, was also obliged to fulfil the conditions with the CEECs when 
famous Copenhagen criteria was introduced at Copenhagen Summit of 1993. After 1999, 
when Turkey was granted the status of candidacy, the country has undergone a process 
of rule adoption first by the coalition and then the incumbent AKP government. Apart 
from the CEECs, Turkey demonstrates a mixed picture for the effectiveness of EU 
conditionality. On the one hand, the country considerably aimed to comply with EU 
conditions by adopting a wide range of harmonization packages in line with the EU until 
2007. On the other hand, political reforms begun to gradually stall in the post-2007 period 
and drastically reverse after 2011, which created a situation where the achievements of 
the first period were lost. 
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Taking consideration of all rule adoption and harmonization packages adopted by 
the ruling elites, we can argue that the period of 1999-2006 was the golden era of political 
conditionality. First, the lack of domestic veto players towards Turkey’s membership 
within both Turkey and the EU, and high commitment and credibility of both sides 
enabled the government to pursue the process of rule adoption, not only in low concern 
technical issues, which require a small degree of adoption costs, but also in the high 
concern political issues, including the removal of the SSCs, amendments made in the 
Penal Code, and supremacy of international treaties over the domestic legislation. There 
is no doubt that high degree of effectiveness was particularly strengthened with the 
membership incentive. Even though the EU has never promised a clear membership 
incentive to Turkey, the declaration of Turkish candidacy at the Helsinki Summit of 1999 
and good relations between the EU and Turkey stimulated the government to meet the 
requirements. Therefore, favourable domestic conditions combined with high EU 
credibility led to an increase in the fulfilment of the conditions on a wide range of issues, 
culminating the effectiveness of EU conditionality policy in the case of Turkey between 
the years of 1999 and 2007. 
After the opening of accession negotiations when the reward was immediately paid 
by the EU in exchange of rule adoption, one can further argue that the government would 
stop complying with conditions due to a number of factors. The opening of accession 
negotiations not only started a new path for Turkey-EU Relations but also raised several 
discussions by some member states opposed to Turkish entry. They particularly argue 
that as the membership of Turkey would be too ‘costly’ and put certain challenges on the 
well-functioning of EU institutions, they first argued that Turkey is not a European 
country. The country does not simply share the same common historical and social 
background with them, which is extremely important.  Until 2005, the ongoing discussion 
on possible Turkish entry into the EU was based on the logic of consequentiality by 
analysing the potential costs and benefits. The general consensus towards Turkey’s 
membership was simple. Turkey is not a democratic liberal country, which might 
endanger the presence fabric of the EU. However, by arguing that Turkey does not belong 
Europe, they begun to legitimize the exclusion of Turkey based on ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ or normative constructivist approaches, which formally cannot be 
debatable as Turkey had been considered as ‘eligible’ for membership by the 
Commission. Therefore, the ongoing discussions over the identity of Turkey, absorption 
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capacity, alternative options to membership, the Cyprus debate, and a lack of clear 
membership prospective all led to a decrease in the credibility of conditionality after 
2005. 
The credibility and effectiveness of EU conditionality had been worsened when the 
domestic veto players inside Turkey came to the forefront after 2006. Th emergence or 
visibility of domestic veto players coming from the Turkish military, judiciary and 
societal opposition groups led to an increase in the costs of material rule adoption on the 
path to fulfilling the conditions, which led to a decrease in the degree of compliance of 
the ruling elites. The apparent resonance of the military and the judiciary as the major 
guardians of the secular Turkish state against the government’s policies induced the ruling 
elites to concentrate on the survival of the government rather than fulfilling EU 
conditions. However, it has to be noted that the government still kept complying with EU 
conditions in spite of the weakened EU anchor. The important thing here is that the 
reforms undertaken by the ruling elites remained limited to certain issues, which required 
a low degree of adoption cost or may serve the interests of the AKP government. The 
ruling elites remained reluctant to comply with issues, which were highly criticized by 
the EU in each Progress Report. Further, even though there had been a wide range of 
amendments regarding the efficiency of the judiciary or training of judges and 
prosecutors, the government starting from 2011 remained reluctant to make further 
arrangements in the high concern political issues, which might pose certain challenges on 
the survival and power of its government as in the case of the High Council or freedom 
of expression. The government not only remained reluctant to make further reforms, the 
reforms undertaken by the previous terms were dramatically reversed as the government 
attached a particular importance to domestic challenges by taking highly criticized 
measurements for the survival of its democratically elected government  
Therefore, the effectiveness of political conditionality highly depends on the 
domestic costs of compliance of the target government combined with the presence of 
veto players. The thesis, therefore, argues that in spite of the four variables of the EIM, it 
has been the domestic cost of compliance combined with the presence of veto players that 
predominantly determines the efficiency of EU conditionality as in the case of Turkey. 
Favourable domestic conditions combined with high commitment and credibility of both 
sides would be resulted in efficient conditionality. Nonetheless, as shown in the Progress 
Reports, conditionality framework does not work in Turkey particularly after 2011.  
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APPENDICES 
Table 1: Turkish Alignment to the EU’s Judicial System                                  
                    The Judicial System based on Turkey’s Progress Reports 1999-2016 
 Evaluation Conclusion Alignment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1999 Regular 
Report (p. 9-
10) 
 
 
 
• Concern over the 
State Security 
Courts(SSCs), 
which deal with 
overtly political 
crimes.  
 
• ECHR: ‘The 
presence of a 
military judge in 
the SCC panel 
violated the 
European 
Convention of 
Human Rights.  
 
• The necessity of 
‘Independent and 
impartial 
tribunal’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Raising awareness and 
improving training of 
judges and 
prosecutors in the 
human rights are of 
great importance.  
 
• Constitutional 
amendments 
removing the 
military judge in 
the SSCs: Retrial 
of Öcalan  
 
•  A number of draft 
proposals on the 
functioning of the 
judicial system: 
➢ Penal Code 
lifting the 
death penalty 
 
➢ Law 
facilitating the 
prosecution 
of public 
officers 
 
➢ Law amending 
the Code of 
Criminal 
Procedure on 
the basis of 
witness 
protection, 
payment of 
compensation 
to witnesses, 
physical 
examination 
and genetic 
analyses. 
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Table 1: Turkish Alignment to the EU’s Judicial System                                  
The Judicial System based on Turkey’s Progress Reports 1999-2016 
 Evaluation Conclusion Alignment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000 
Regular 
Report (p. 
12-13) 
 
 
 
• A positive 
development over 
the increase of the 
number of judges 
and prosecutors 
• Draft Penal Code 
and the Code of 
Criminal 
Procedure has to 
be adopted.  
• The functioning, 
powers and 
responsibilities of 
the SSC have to 
be brought in line 
with EU 
standards.  
• Measures 
designed to make 
reparation for the 
consequences of 
convictions found 
contrary to the 
ECHR should be 
taken.  
• Further efforts are 
required to 
enhance training 
for judges and 
prosecutors, 
particularly 
related to allege 
torture.  
 
• No attempt to 
increase the 
efficiency of the 
judicial system: A 
large caseload & long 
judicial procedures 
 
• Turkey has not yet 
signed any of the 
Council of Europe 
Conventions in 
combating bribery of 
International 
Business 
Transactions.  
 
• An encouraging 
development with the 
adaptation of the Law 
on the prosecution of 
civil servants and 
other State officials 
 
• On EC Law, a 2-day 
training programme for 
150 people took place 
in October 2000, within 
the framework of 
Greece-Turkey 
cooperation. 
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2001 
Regular 
Report 
(p.16-18) 
 
 
 
• The limited number 
of juvenile courts 
resulting in backlog 
and long duration of 
court cases 
 
• There is still a need to 
guarantee the 
independence of the 
judiciary from the 
executive, to further 
reform the state 
security and military 
courts and to introduce 
the possibility of 
reparations for 
violations of the 
ECHR.  
 
• There is a problem 
with the structure of 
juvenile courts, which 
are too limited in 
number, resulting in a 
backlog and long 
duration of court cases. 
 
 
 
 
• There is no still 
possibility under the 
Code of Criminal 
Procedure to reopen 
impugned proceedings 
or to take any other 
action to readdress 
violations of the 
ECHR. 
• A law was 
adopted, which 
established 
criminal 
enforcement 
judges for 
reviewing 
complaints by 
prisoners 
concerning their 
rights.  
 
• 12 sections 
regarding 
intellectual 
property rights 
were set up. 
 
• Judicial sections 
dealing with 
consumer 
protection were 
created in courts 
in Istanbul, 
Ankara and Izmir.  
 
• Constitutional and 
legal amendments 
for restructuring 
of SSCs entered 
into force. 
 
 
• Numerous courses 
to train judges, 
prosecutors and 
judicial staff have 
been held.  
 
• The 
implementation of 
the 1998 law on 
the increase of 
legal interest rates 
for delayed 
compensation in 
cases involving 
public 
expropriations is a 
positive 
development.  
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2002 
Regular 
Report 
(p.20-23) 
 
 
 
• Despite 
limitations to 
the jurisdictions 
of SSCs, the 
powers, 
responsibilities 
and 
functioning of 
them still need 
to be brought 
in line with EU 
standards.  
 
• The 
establishment of 
a Court of 
Appeal would 
be an important 
step forward in 
ensuring to a fair 
trial, and 
increase the 
speed and 
efficiency of the 
judiciary. 
 
 
• Lack of clarity, 
transparency 
and legal 
certainty in day 
to day practice 
of the law.  
 
• The jurisdiction 
of military 
courts over 
civilians is 
another concern 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Large backlog and long 
duration of judicial 
proceedings 
• No further progress regarding 
the establishment of 
intermediate courts of appeal 
 
• Inconsistent use, by public 
prosecutors, of a broad range 
of articles of the Penal Code, 
when applied to cases related 
to freedom of expression 
 
 
• Certain tendency by 
prosecutors to use other 
provisions of the Penal Code 
to limit freedom of 
expression, particularly 
applied to students 
petitioning for optional 
language course at 
university 
 
• There are continued reports 
that the judiciary does not 
always act in an independent 
and consistent manner. 
• A new Civic Code 
entered into force with 
changes on gender 
equality, freedom of 
association, child 
protection.  
 
• The system of 
enforcement judges was 
established.  
• The SSCs continue to 
function with some 
modifications in relation 
to prosecution methods 
and criminal organization. 
 
• The right of defense for 
detainees falling under the 
competence of the SSCs 
has been improved: the 
right to access to a 
lawyer only after 48 
hours 
 
• In spite of the increase of 
the number of juvenile 
courts, there has been no 
progress concerning the 
structure and the remit of 
them.  
• The Constitutional 
Court’s ruling of 2002 
regarding the application 
of the ECHR is a positive 
development, which 
should help guarantee fair 
trial under Article 6 of the 
ECHR. 
 
• Provisions of the third 
reform package regarding 
the retrial in the event of 
convictions found 
contrary to the ECHR, 
were adopted.  
• Training programmes 
have continued, covering 
fair trial, the fight against 
organized crime and the 
new Civil Code  
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2003 
Regular 
Report 
(p. 19-22) 
 
 
 
• The functioning of the 
judiciary, both judges 
and prosecutors are 
faced with a large 
backlog and long 
duration of trial 
proceedings. 
 
• The number of judges 
and prosecutors has 
been increased and the 
National Judicial 
Network Project in 
progress 
 
 
• The continuation in the 
training of judges and 
prosecutors 
 
• The judiciary plays an 
important role in the 
implementation of 
political reform but 
there are still signs of 
inconsistent use of 
articles of the Penal 
Code, particularly in 
relation to freedom of 
expression.  
 
• In spite of some 
progress regarding the 
detainee’s rights and the 
elimination of 
‘incommunicado 
detention, the powers, 
responsibilities and 
functioning of the 
SSCs still need to be 
brought in line with 
EU standards in terms 
of protection of human 
rights and 
fundamental 
freedoms, in particular 
the rights of defence.  
 
• There has been no 
progress regarding 
the establishment of 
intermediate courts 
of appeal.  
 
• There continue to 
be reports that the 
judiciary does not 
always act in an 
impartial and 
consistent manner. 
 
 
• The structure of 
judicial system 
puts pressure on 
judges and 
prosecutors since 
the Supreme 
Council of Judges 
and Prosecutors 
chaired by Minister 
of Justice and the 
Undersecretary of 
the Ministry of 
Justice is a member.  
 
• Processing of 
evidence: day to 
day practice tends to 
suggest that public 
prosecutors are not 
always adequately 
informed by the 
security forces 
about the facts 
surrounding 
detention. 
 
• The law on the 
establishment of 
family courts was 
adopted.  
 
• The Code of Civil 
Procedure and 
Criminal Procedure 
have been amended to 
allow re-trial in civil 
and criminal cases 
found contrary to 
ECHR.  
 
 
• The law on juvenile 
courts has been 
amended raising from 
15 to 18 the age at 
which young people 
must be tried in 
juvenile courts. 
 
• The law on the 
Forensic Medicine 
Institution has been 
amended with the aim 
of accelerating 
judicial procedures.  
• The law on the 
establishment and 
Trial Procedures of 
Military Courts has 
been amended to end 
military jurisdiction 
over civilians.  
 
• The Judicial Network 
Project has been in 
progress, A Justice 
Academy was 
established to train 
judges and 
prosecutors, and a 
guide book including 
Turkish translation of 
the case law of the 
ECtHR was 
distributed.  
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2004 
Regu
lar 
Repo
rt (p. 
23-
28) 
 
 
 
• There has been a 
reduction in the 
average trial 
period to 
increase 
efficiency. 
 
• The number of 
judges and 
prosecutors has 
remained largely 
stable but their 
salaries, 
although still 
law, were 
increased.  
 
 
• Judges and 
prosecutors have 
a considerable 
role to play in the 
implementation 
of political 
reforms. The 
Court of 
Cassation has 
delivered 
important 
judgements 
applying the 
reforms 
concerning the 
use of Kurdish 
language, re-
trial, torture 
and freedom of 
expression. 
 
•  
 
 
 
• So far as prosecutions 
are concerned, public 
prosecutors are 
responsible for 
supervising all phases of 
criminal proceedings. 
However, in practice, 
they often exercise 
little or no supervision 
over police and 
gendarmerie officers 
during the investigation 
of a crime, in part due to 
their heavy workload.  
 
• The principle of the 
independence of the 
judiciary is enshrined in 
the Turkish Constitution 
but it is to a certain 
extent undermined by 
several other 
Constitutional 
provisions.  
 
 
• Authority of the High 
Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors, chaired by 
the Ministry of Justice 
on the, on the 
appointment, 
promotion, discipline 
and the careers of all 
judges and prosecutors 
 
 
 
• The SSCs and The Office of 
the Chief Public Prosecutor 
for SSCs have been abolished 
and replaced by Regional 
Serious Felony Courts.  
• Improvement of the rights of 
defence, the operation of 
Justice Academy, further 
training of judges and 
prosecutors, seven handbooks 
distributed and seminars held.  
• The principle of the 
supremacy of international 
and European Treaties over 
domestic legislation adopted 
• A new Penal Code adopted 
by strengthening sanctions 
against certain human rights 
violations  
• The law on establishing the 
Intermediate Courts of 
Appeal was approved but 
required additional enactment 
of several laws to come into 
force.  
• The Law on Notification 
was amended. 
• The Regulation on 
Apprehension, detention 
and Statement Taking was 
amended to extend the rights 
of detainees.  
• The Law on Juvenile Courts 
was amended with the 
increase of their numbers.  
• The Commercial Code was 
amended to establish 
specialised courts to hear 
maritime cases.   
• The Law on Family Courts 
was amended to exclude from 
the jurisdiction of the Family 
Courts all non-family law 
matters. 
• A new Regulation was 
adopted to extend the scope of 
legal aid to cover court costs.  
• The National Judicial 
Network Project has 
continued to progress.  
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2005 
Regular 
Report 
(p. 15-
17) 
 
 
 
• Important progress 
was made with the 
entry into force on 1 
June 2005 of the 
Penal Code, the 
Code of Criminal 
Procedure, the Law 
on Enforcement of 
Sentences and the 
Law on the 
Establishment of the 
regional Courts of 
Appeal. 
 
• The Law on 
Enforcement of 
Sentences is 
generally in line 
with EU best 
practice and 
addresses issues 
such as prisoners’ 
rights and 
obligations, order 
and discipline 
within prisons, and 
rehabilitation and 
reintegration of 
offenders. 
 
• A clear institutional 
and functional 
separation of the 
professional rights 
and duties of judges 
and prosecutors 
needs to be 
established. 
 
• It is of crucial 
importance that 
sustained efforts 
continue with 
respect to training 
judges, prosecutors 
and lawyers. 
• In spite of the adaptation of 
the Penal Code, concerns 
remain regarding articles 
which may be used to restrict 
freedom of expression 
 
• Concerns related to the 
provisions concerning the 
rights of defence and the 
rights of detainees in the new 
Code.  
 
• This Law provides that, at the 
request of the public 
prosecutor, and with the 
authorisation of an 
enforcement judge, a law 
enforcement officer may be 
present during meetings 
between prisoners and 
lawyer, which has been 
criticised for being in 
contravention of Article 10 of 
the Turkish Constitution, 
which concerns equality 
before the law. 
 
• The principle of the 
independence of the judiciary 
is enshrined in the Turkish 
constitution but is 
undermined by several other 
constitutional provisions. 
 
• On the one hand, there are 
signs that the judiciary is 
increasingly integrating the 
new provisions. On the other 
hand, courts have issued 
judgments in the opposite 
direction in the area of 
freedom of expression, 
including against journalists. 
• The adoption of 
a new Code of 
Criminal 
Procedure 
represents a 
major step 
forward. Cross 
examination of 
witnesses during 
trials introduced, 
the concept of 
plea bargaining 
established.  
 
• In order to reduce 
the number of 
unmeritorious 
prosecutions, the 
Code increases 
the discretion of 
prosecutors, who 
are now able to 
assess the strength 
of the evidence 
before preparing 
an indictment. 
 
• An interpreter 
free of charge for 
ones, who cannot 
speak the Turkish 
language 
 
• The Law 
Establishing the 
Intermediate 
Courts of Appeal 
came into force, 
which will 
substantially 
reduce the case 
load.  
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2006 
Regular 
Report 
(p. 8-
10) 
 
 
 
• The authorities 
have been 
focusing on the 
implementation 
of the new Penal 
Code, the Code 
of Criminal 
Procedure and 
the Law on 
Enforcement of 
Sentences.  
 
• Overall, there 
was continued 
progress in the 
area of judicial 
reform. However, 
implementation 
of the new 
legislation by 
the judiciary 
presents a mixed 
picture so far 
and the 
independence of 
the judiciary 
still needs to be 
further 
established. 
 
 
 
 
• One circular of particular 
importance concerns the 
implementation of legislation on 
arrest, detention and statement 
taking and the prevention of 
human rights violations during 
these practices. 
 
• Certain provisions of the Penal 
Code, in particular Article 301, 
have been used to restrict the 
expression of non-violent 
opinions. 
 
 
• A number of cases have shown 
inconsistency in the judiciary 
approach to the interpretation of 
legislation. 
 
• The establishment of the judicial 
police has led to some tensions 
between the law enforcement 
bodies and prosecutors. 
 
• Various provisions of the 
Turkish Constitution and of 
domestic law guarantee this 
principle. However, a number 
of factors are perceived as 
undermining it. The structure 
of the High Council of Judges 
and Prosecutors 
 
• Questions were raised on the 
independence of the High 
Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors in the aftermath of 
the publication in March 2006 of 
the indictment on the Şemdlinli 
bombing 
• The Ministry of 
Justice updated all 
existing circulars 
by issuing some 
100 new circulars 
mainly addressed 
to public 
prosecutors in 
January 2006. 
 
• 620 new judges 
were recruited. 
Training 
activities 
continued, the 
budget of the 
Ministry of 
Justice increased 
and the 
programme of 
building Courts 
of First Instance 
continued. The 
establishment of 
Regional Courts 
of Appeal is 
proceeding. 
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2007 
Regular 
Report 
(p. 9-10) 
 
 
 
• Some progress has been made in 
terms of the efficiency of the 
judiciary, including through 
amendments to the Turkish 
Criminal Code (CC) and the 
Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) 
adopted in December 2006. 
 
• Efforts to modernise the 
judiciary through the use of 
information technology 
continued. 
 
• Overall, there has been some 
progress as regards the 
efficiency of the judiciary 
through implementation of 
adopted legislation and 
continued use of IT. However, 
tensions in the relations between 
the government and the 
judiciary have not been 
conducive to the smooth and 
effective functioning of the 
system. More needs to be done 
in terms of strengthening the 
independence and impartiality 
of the judiciary. Finally, there is 
no overall National Reform 
Strategy for the Judiciary or a 
plan to implement it. 
 
 
 
 
 
• Concerns remain as 
regards the 
independence and the 
impartiality of the 
judiciary. 
 
The election of the new 
president in April 
 
• There have been 
tensions as regards the 
appointment of high 
court judges. 
• Positive 
results of 
the National 
Judicial 
Network 
Project 
 
• Increased 
number of 
judges and 
prosecutors, 
and the 
funds for 
the 
judiciary 
 
• Şemdinli 
Case 
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2008 
Regular 
Report 
(p. 9-
10) 
 
 
 
• Judicial reform strategy, which 
covers issues related to the 
independence, impartiality, 
efficiency and effectiveness of 
the judiciary, enhancement of 
its professionalism, the 
management system and 
measures to enhance confidence 
in the judiciary, to facilitate 
access to justice and to improve 
the penitentiary system. 
 
• Other high-profile cases 
underlined the importance of the 
quality of the investigation. This 
pointed to the need to improve 
the institutional relationship 
between, on the one hand, the 
police and the gendarmerie and, 
on the other, the judiciary. 
 
 
• Overall, the work to date on the 
draft judicial reform strategy has 
been a positive development. 
The Ministry of Justice needs 
to continue and expand the 
consultations with all 
stakeholders, including civil 
society, and build the 
necessary broad support for 
the strategy. However, concerns 
remain as regards the 
independence and impartiality 
of the judiciary. Reforms in the 
area of the judiciary are a priority 
of the Accession Partnership. 
 
 
 
 
• There have been no 
developments on 
establishment of the 
regional courts of 
appeal. This is a matter 
of concern. 
 
• There is a need to 
strengthen efforts to 
ensure that 
interpretation by the 
judiciary of legislation 
related to human rights 
and fundamental 
freedoms is in line with 
the ECHR, with the 
case-law of ECtHR and 
with article 90 of the 
Turkish Constitution. 
 
• Concerns remain about 
the impartiality of the 
judiciary. 
 
• As regards 
independence, there 
has been no progress 
on the composition of 
the High Council of 
Judges and 
Prosecutors or on the 
reporting lines of 
judicial inspectors. 
 
• The Şemdinli case was 
transferred to the Van 
military court following 
a decision of the Court 
of Cassation. 
• The 
number of 
judges and 
prosecutors 
and the 
funds 
available to 
the 
judiciary 
increased.  
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2009 
Regular 
Report 
(p. 11-
12) 
 
 
 
• The government approved the 
judicial reform strategy in 
August 2009. This is a positive 
step, both in terms of the 
consultative process followed 
before its approval but also 
because its content broadly 
provides the right direction for 
reforms. 
 
• Concerns remain about the 
independence, impartiality and 
efficiency of the judiciary. As 
regards independence, there has 
been no progress on the 
composition of the High Council 
of Judges and Prosecutors or on 
the reporting lines of judicial 
inspectors. (Şemdinli Case & 
interception of telephone calls & 
establishment of the regional 
courts of appeal) 
 
• Overall, some progress has been 
made in the area of the judiciary. 
The adoption by the government of 
the judicial reform strategy 
following a process of consultation 
with all stakeholders is a positive 
step. The measures taken to 
increase staff and funding are also 
positive. However, these efforts 
need to be continued, and 
concerns remain with regard to 
the independence, impartiality 
and effectiveness of the 
judiciary, such as the 
composition of the High Council 
of Judges and Prosecutors and 
the establishment of the regional 
courts of appeal. 
 
 
 
• Some progress was made in 
hiring judicial staff. However, 
the overall number of 
vacancies for judges and 
prosecutors remains 
significant. 
 
• High-profile cases raised 
concerns about the quality of 
the investigations. 
Furthermore, there is a need to 
improve the working 
relationship between the police 
and the gendarmerie on the one 
hand and the judiciary on the 
other. (the alleged criminal 
network Ergenekon & the 
murder of three Protestants in 
Malatya & the murder of Hrant 
Dink) 
 
• Members of the judiciary 
reportedly do not limit pre-
trial detention to 
circumstances where it is 
strictly necessary in the public 
interest resulting in the 
overcrowding of prisons.  
 
• There are concerns as regards 
juvenile justice. 
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2010 
Regular 
Report 
(p.12-
14) 
 
 
 
• Implementation of the 
2009 judicial reform 
strategy has continued. 
Some of the central 
pillars of the strategy 
were put in place by the 
amendments to the 
Constitution. 
 
• The amendments to 
the Constitution open 
to judicial review 
decisions by the High 
Council dismissing 
members of the 
judiciary from the 
profession. 7 
 
• Overall, there has been 
progress in the area of 
the judiciary. The 
adoption of the 
amendments to the 
Constitution on the 
composition of the 
High Council of Judges 
and Prosecutors as well 
as the limitation of the 
authority of military 
courts is a positive step. 
However, the Minister 
of Justice still chairs 
the High Council and 
has the last word on 
investigations. 
Attention needs to be 
paid to establishing an 
effective dialogue with 
all stakeholders and to 
implementing these 
reforms in accordance 
with European 
standards and in an 
open, transparent and 
inclusive way. 
 
 
 
 
 
• Judicial inspectors 
responsible for evaluating 
the performance of judges 
and prosecutors henceforth 
will report to the High 
Council and no longer to 
the Ministry of Justice. 
However, the minister is 
still President of the High 
Council and the 
investigative authority of 
the High Council is 
subject to his approval. 
 
• The Semdinli case is still 
pending. The dismissal of 
the civilian prosecutor 
previously in charge of the 
case, together with the 
handling of the case to date, 
has raised questions about 
the independence of the 
High Council. 
 
• The involvement of the 
Turkish parliament in 
the election of 
Constitutional Court 
judges brings Turkish 
practice closer to that of 
EU Member States. 
However, two of the 
judges are still military 
judges and the selection of 
military judges 
(impartiality questionable) 
 
 
• The overall number of 
vacancies for judges and 
prosecutors 
• The regional courts of 
appeal not established yet. 
 
 
• As regards the 
independence 
of the 
judiciary: 
increased the 
number of full 
members of the 
High Council 
of Judges and 
Prosecutors, 
the new 
representatives 
of first instance 
judges, the 
Justice 
Academy, law 
faculties and 
lawyers. 
  
• The 
amendments to 
the 
Constitution  
 
 
• The 
establishment 
of A 
Secretariat-
General under 
the High 
Council 
(previously 
provided by 
the Ministry of 
Justice) 
 
• With regard 
to 
impartiality, 
constitutional 
provisions 
allowing 
military courts 
to try civilians 
have been 
taken out of 
the 
Constitution 
and new 
provisions 
explicitly 
prohibit such 
trials 
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2011 
Regular 
Report 
(p.14-18) 
 
 
 
• There has been 
progress in the reform 
of the judiciary, 
notably with 
implementing the 
2010 constitutional 
amendments. 
 
• Ministerial influence 
has been reduced. 
 
• However, neither an 
overall common 
strategic framework 
nor reliable indicators 
and benchmarks have 
been established by 
the Ministry of Justice 
and the High Council 
for Judges and 
Prosecutors to assess 
the performance of 
courts and of the 
judicial system as a 
whole. 
 
• The Ministry and the 
High Council have 
yet to develop 
benchmarks to 
monitor and assess 
the duration of court 
proceedings and 
improve the 
efficiency and 
effectiveness of the 
judicial system.  
 
• There is a need to 
review the existing 
strategy fashion, so 
that the revised 
strategy will be 
owned by the Turkish 
legal community and 
the wider public. 
 
• Further steps are 
needed on the 
• The composition and 
elections of members of the 
High Council  
 
• Nomination of the four 
non-judicial me the 
President of the 
Republic, whereas the 
National Assembly is 
not involved. The 
current provisions do 
not ensure permanent 
representation of 
members of the Bar in 
the High Council. 
 
• The Minister can veto 
the launching of 
disciplinary 
investigations against 
judges and prosecutors 
by the High Council. 
 
 
• The judicial review 
does not cover all first-
instance decisions of 
the High Council, 
potentially affecting 
judicial independence 
or impartiality 
 
• Lack of clarity and 
precision on the 
dismissal of judges 
and prosecutors 
 
 
• Overcentralized 
assessment of 
professional of judges 
and prosecutors 
 
• Criticism of the 
judicial reforms of Bar 
and independent 
Associations  
➢ Over-dominated by the 
High Courts, the president, 
• As regards the 
independence of 
the judiciary, a 
Law on the High 
Prosecutors was 
adopted as a new 
composition of 
the High Council. 
• The Inspection 
Board transferred 
to the High 
Council.  
Anonymised versions of 
decisions published on 
website. (legal certainty 
and confidence) 
appeals to judicial bodies 
against decisions 
concerning dismissal from 
the profession 
• With regard to 
impartiality, a 
Law on the 
Constitutional 
Court was 
adopted.  
 
• The powers of the 
Constitutional 
Court have been 
extended by 
introducing the 
individual 
application 
procedure.  
 
• the Laws on the 
Court of 
Cassation and the 
Council of State 
were amended in 
order to tackle 
their large and 
increasing 
backlog of cases 
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independence, 
impartiality and 
efficiency of the 
judiciary, including 
the criminal justice 
system and the large 
backlog of pending 
serious criminal 
cases.  
 
 
 
and inadequacy of the role 
of the parliament in the 
selection procedure 
 
• Minority and the large 
metropolitan Bars not 
represented during the 
selection of judges and 
prosecutors, and the 
presence of two military 
members of the 
Constitutional Courts 
 
• The principle of equality of 
arms is questionable and 
the impartiality of the 
judiciary at risk in key 
cases 
• The regional courts of 
appeal have not been 
established yet 
 
• The backlog of pending 
cases at the Turkish courts 
is increasing and Turkey 
has a large backlog of 
pending serious criminal 
cases. 
 
• The duration of cases 
involving pre-trial 
detention 
 
 
• Frequent use of arrest 
instead of judicial 
supervision, leaks of 
information, evidence or 
statements, limited access 
to files, failure to give 
detailed grounds for 
detention decisions and 
revision of such decisions 
• More chambers 
established, 
working methods 
modified, a large 
number of judges 
and prosecutors 
appointed and the 
appointment 
procedure was 
transparent.  
 
• Legislation was 
adopted in March 
2011 to reduce the 
workload of first-
instance courts. 
 
• The 2011 budget 
for the judiciary 
increased. 
 
• A Regulation on 
the judicial police, 
as provided for 
under Article 167 
of the CPC, was 
adopted in 2005. It 
came into force on 
1 June 2005 
together with the 
CPC but has yet to 
be implemented. 
 
• Cross-
examination in 
criminal trials is 
not fully 
implemented. 
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                    The Judicial System based on Turkey’s Progress Reports 1999-2016 
 Evaluation Conclusion Alignment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012 
Regular 
Report 
(p. 13-
17) 
 
 
 
• With regard to the 
efficiency of the 
judiciary, 
amendments to the 
Laws on the Court of 
Cassation and the 
Council of State 
aiming at tackling 
their backlog of cases 
started to generate 
positive results, 
although the backlog 
is still considerable. 
 
• Revision of the 
Justice Ministry’s 
2009 Judicial Reform 
Strategy, whose 
objectives were 
achieved to a large 
extent, continues, 
with the participation 
of all stakeholders, 
the Turkish legal 
community and civil 
society. 
 
• Overall, some 
progress has been 
made in the area of the 
judiciary. Legislation 
has been amended to 
improve the 
efficiency of the 
judiciary and address 
the increasing 
backlog of the courts. 
The third judicial 
reform package, 
adopted in July, while 
failing to sufficiently 
address problematic 
areas in the 
administration of the 
Turkish criminal 
justice system, 
constitutes a step in 
the right direction. 
The 2009 Judicial 
Reform Strategy is 
being revised. 
• However, criticisms of the 
legislation on the High 
Council, including of the role 
given to the Minister of 
Justice and to the Under-
secretary of the Ministry, 
have not been addressed.  
 
• Decisions to suspend 
prosecutors in the Deniz 
Feneri case reflected pressure 
from the executive. 
• Failure in the implementation 
of international agreements 
 
• The Regulation on the 
Judicial Police adopted in 
2005 under Article 167 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code has 
not yet been implemented in 
accordance with European 
standards and there are no 
judicial police units attached 
to prosecution offices. 
• Under the revised Article 10 
of the Anti-terror Law, 
however, prior approval of 
the authorities for 
government officials is now 
needed including for crimes 
committed in the framework 
of an organisation to gain 
illegal economic advantage; 
launder money; or produce or 
traffic drugs.  
 
• The third package fails to 
sufficiently revise 
problematic areas related to 
the administration of justice 
and protection of 
fundamental rights; it does 
not address issues related to 
definitions of criminal 
offences under either the 
Criminal Code or the Anti-
terror Law that are at the 
source of a number of 
problems of the Turkish 
criminal justice system. 
• As regards the 
independence 
of the 
judiciary, the 
High Council 
of Judges and 
Prosecutors 
established its 
Strategic Plan 
2012-2016. 
• With regard to 
impartiality, 
the individual 
application 
procedure 
entered into 
force.  
 
• The Ministry 
of Justice is 
drafting a 
Human Rights 
Action Plan, 
based on the 
case law of the 
European 
Court of 
Human Rights. 
 
• A third judicial 
reform 
package 
aiming to 
accelerate 
judicial 
procedures was 
adopted. 
 
• Under the new 
legislation, not 
possible for 
courts; 
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2013 
Regular 
Report 
(p. 12) 
 
 
 
• The High Council of Judges 
and Prosecutors continued 
with the implementation of its 
2012-16 strategic plan, 
broadly promoting the 
independence, impartiality 
and efficiency of the judiciary. 
 
• The 3rd Judicial Reform 
Package, adopted in July 
2012, started to produce 
results, in particular as regards 
detention (including its 
length). 
 
 
• The 4th Judicial Reform 
Package provides judicial 
remedies for a number of 
issues on which Turkey had 
been condemned by the 
European Court of Human 
Rights.(Narrowed the scope of 
terror-related crimes) 
 
• Further efforts are needed to 
consolidate the independence, 
impartiality and efficiency of 
the judiciary, including the 
criminal justice system. 
 
 
 
 
• Criticisms of the legislation on the 
High Council, including of the role 
given to the Minister of Justice and 
to the Under-Secretary of the 
Ministry, have, however, not been 
addressed as yet. 
 
• In any constitutional reform, 
Turkey needs to consolidate the 
achievements of the 2010 
constitutional amendments, 
particularly related to the 
composition of the High Council. 
 
• Concerns about legislation and 
practice in the criminal justice 
system remained, in particular as 
regards the capacity of prosecutors 
to lead investigations, limited 
access by the defence to 
prosecution files, poor 
implementation of cross-
examination at trial, and the poor 
quality or lack of reasoning in 
indictments 
 
• No significant change in the 
gender balance in the profession, 
with women making up 
approximately a quarter of the 
judiciary and underrepresented in 
particular in prosecutorial and 
managerial positions. 
 
• The scope and quality of legal aid 
is inadequate and there is no 
effective monitoring that would 
contribute to remedying long-
standing problems. 
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Table 1: Turkish Alignment to the EU’s Judicial System                                  
                    The Judicial System based on Turkey’s Progress Reports 1999-2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 
Regu
lar 
Repo
rt (p. 
13-
14) 
 
Evaluation 
• The amendments to 
the Law on High 
Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors and the 
subsequent dismissal 
of staff and numerous 
reassignments of 
judges and 
prosecutors raised 
serious concerns over 
the independence and 
impartiality of the 
judiciary and the 
separation of powers. 
 
• The Turkish 
Constitutional Court 
found a number of 
provisions 
unconstitutional and 
gave the legislature a 
deadline of three 
months to adopt 
revised legislation. 
 
• The Constitutional 
Court continued to 
receive individual 
applications. 
(YouTube, and 
Twitter bans, Hrant 
Dink’s murder case) 
 
Conclusion 
• The frequent changes to the 
justice system, with no 
proper stakeholder 
consultation, risk further 
reducing the efficiency of 
the Turkish criminal 
system. 
 
• By abrogating Article 10 of 
the Anti-Terror Law in its 
entirety, the law 
suppressed, together with 
the Regional Serious 
Crimes Courts, their 
special powers and reduced 
the maximum detention on 
remand from ten to five 
years. These reforms were 
adopted without 
transitional provisions and 
risk resulting in affecting 
the effectiveness of the 
courts that are already 
overburdened. 
 
• The lower statutory 
maximum limit of five 
years of detention on 
remand remains excessive 
if compared with practice 
of EU Member States.  
 
 
•  A Law on the National 
Intelligence Services, 
adopted in April, allows 
wiretappings and 
surveillance to be 
conducted by Turkish 
intelligence services 
without judicial oversight, 
which goes against 
European standards. 
• Concerns about criminal 
justice legislation and 
practice remained, in 
particular on the capacity 
of prosecutors to lead 
investigations,  
Alignment 
• In June, parliament 
adopted legislation 
to implement the 
Constitutional 
Court’s decision. 
This legislation 
brought back the 
legal provisions 
introduced in 2010, 
restoring thus the 
role of the plenary 
which is a key 
guarantee of the 
independence of the 
judiciary. 
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2015 
Regular 
Report 
(p.13-
15) 
 
 
 
• Turkey‘s judicial system 
reached some level of 
preparation. Between 
2007 and 2013, the 
judicial system had 
achieved significant 
improvements, related to 
its independence, the 
quality of trials, 
juvenile justice, a 
substantial reduction 
in use of police custody, 
more limited use of 
pre-trial detention, and 
respect for human and 
fundamental rights, 
including abiding by the 
case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR).  
 
• Overall, the quality of 
judicial decisions has 
improved in recent 
years, but the weak 
reasoning and poor 
quality of certain 
indictments – without 
appropriate selection 
and assessment of 
relevance of evidence to 
support the case – 
remain a serious 
criminal justice issue. 
 
• Courts across the 
country tend to have 
modern ICT equipment. 
Turkey has observer 
status in the European 
Judicial Training 
Network (EJTN). 
However, Courts do not 
issue regular activity 
reports. 
 
 
• There has been no progress since early 
2014. The independence of the 
judiciary and respect of the principle 
of separation of powers have been 
undermined and judges and 
prosecutors have been under strong 
political pressure. 
 
• Following legislative changes in 2014 
and personnel changes in the Council, 
the executive reasserted its influence 
over the Council.  
 
 
• The serious concerns over the 
composition of the High Council, role 
of the Minister of Justice acting as 
president and his under-secretary 
holding an extensive role in the 
HSYK, particularly on disciplinary 
issues and transfers. More transparency 
in the work of HSYK and its strict 
adherence to procedures are needed to 
strengthen its credibility and trust in the 
judiciary. 
 
• In practice, there are numerous reports 
of selective justice and political 
interference in court cases. 
Representatives of the executive have 
continued to publicly undermine the 
credibility of the judiciary as a whole. 
 
• The appointment and training of judges 
and prosecutors constitute an important 
concern 
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2016 
Regular 
Report 
(p. 17-
20) 
 
 
 
• Turkey’s judicial system has 
reached an early stage/some 
level of preparation. There 
has been backsliding in the 
past year, in particular with 
regard to the independence 
of the judiciary which 
represents a significant 
challenge to the overall 
functioning of the judiciary. 
• In general, the Turkish 
judicial system has enough 
capacity to handle its 
caseload. The establishment 
of the Court of Appeals from 
20 July 2016 will contribute 
to ensuring the consistency 
of case-law and help reduce 
the backlog of the Court of 
Cassation.  
 
• The length of proceedings 
has been a long-standing 
issue. The backlog of civil, 
criminal and administrative 
cases, which had been 
reduced in 2012, increased 
again markedly in the 
following years and more 
particularly in 2016.  
 
 
• The judicial network is 
complex and, while there are 
enough support staff, there 
is no human resources 
management strategy. 
 
 
 
 
• The extensive changes to the 
structures and composition of high 
courts are of serious concern as they 
threaten the independence of the 
judiciary and are not in line with 
European standards.  
 
• Judges and prosecutors continued to 
be removed from their profession 
and in some cases were arrested, on 
allegations of conspiring with the 
Gülen movement. The situation 
worsened further after the July coup 
attempt, following which one fifth 
of the judges and prosecutors were 
dismissed and saw their assets 
frozen. 
 
• There was no progress on the 
outstanding issues identified in 
previous reports. 
 
 
• There was no progress in solving the 
persistent problem of the influence 
of the executive over the HSYK, in 
particular following the legislative 
changes of 2014 strengthening the 
powers of the Minister of Justice 
within the HSYK and the 
subsequent staff changes in the 
HSYK. 
 
• As ex officio members, the Minister 
of Justice, acting as President of the 
Council, and his undersecretary 
continue to have substantial 
influence over the work of the 
HSYK.  
 
• The HSYK is therefore widely 
perceived to be the executive’s 
main means of controlling the 
judiciary. More transparency in the 
HSYK’s work and strict adherence 
to procedures are needed to 
strengthen not only the Council’s 
credibility but also public trust in the 
judiciary. 
 
• The application of the principle of 
immovability of judges remains 
highly problematic. Transfers of 
judges and prosecutors against their 
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will were frequent and were not 
open to judicial review. 
 
• A number of disciplinary and 
criminal cases against judges and 
prosecutors have not seen due 
process, being sometimes solely 
based on the indictments and rulings 
pronounced by these same judges 
and prosecutors in the exercise of 
their functions. This contradicts 
basic principles of the rule of law 
and considerably undermines trust 
in the judiciary and its 
independence. 
 
• The law changing the structure and 
composition of the Court of 
Cassation (CoC) and the Council of 
State (CoS) as adopted in July also 
raised serious concerns as to it 
impact on the independence of the 
judiciary. 
 
• Comments by representatives of the 
executive and the legislative 
branches on ongoing judicial cases, 
challenging among others decisions 
taken by the Constitutional Court, 
have continued as a regular practice. 
 
• The magnitude and rapidity of the 
measures taken raise 19 questions on 
criteria applied. These large-scale 
dismissals as well as large-scale 
recruitments of new judges and 
prosecutors raise a serious challenge 
to the performance and 
independence of the judiciary. 
 
• While all lawyers have to abide by 
the rules set by the Union of Turkish 
Bar Associations, there is no code of 
ethics for judges and prosecutors.  
 
• Integrity training is part of the 
curriculum for initial training but 
neither a criterion in the initial 
selection and nomination process, 
nor for appointments to senior 
positions. 
 
 
 
 
 
